Financial Markets and the Global Debt Crisis: Toward a New Architecture for A More Reliable Financial Sector
AbstractThe breakdown of the financial markets in 2007 and the ensuing debt crisis in the EU has produced enormous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The emergence of shadow banking also changed the behavior patterns of management so that its self-interest dominated the interests of shareholders and the other stakeholders. These false incentives led to merger processes in the financial system resulting in market structures in which single institutions became too big or too connected to fail. The empirical developments and the political counter-measures described in this article point to the fact that the macro-perspective has been dominant, neglecting individual irresponsibility and failure.
Copyright (c) 2015 Hans-Georg Petersen, Alexander Martin Wiegelmann
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