Regional Integration and Security: A Comparative Perspective of the European Union and North America

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ABSTRACT

The attacks of September 11, 2001 in Washington (9/11), March 11, 2004 in Madrid (11-M) and July 7 and 21 in London (7-J and 21-J) have turned security into the central issue on international and regional agendas in North America and Europe, now spreading to other regions of the world. As a result of the terrorist attacks, security has developed into an important element of integration by becoming a catalyst for agreements oriented to building security communities. The most complete representation of the construction of a North American bloc can be seen in smart border agreements and in the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Undoubtedly, the security component of North America as a region is increasing and the framework for trilateral convergence exists. In the EU case, the concern about safety was clearly the main basis of accords with a view to the approval of the European Constitution, and it will also strengthen the integration process. Today, consolidating the EU is a matter of security, so Europe is securitizing its agenda.

Key words: regional integration, security community, multidimensional security, terrorism, securitization.

INTRODUCTION

Based on their distinct underlying purposes and divergent paths of development one might question the value in comparing the European Union (EU) and North

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America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Regardless of their levels of integration, however, Europe and North America are two regions with economic, political and social identities. The relatively recent construction and emphasis on immigration, border control and terrorism, as security concerns are common to both regions and are high on their political agendas. A comparison of the approaches each of the regions has taken to address this issue will provide a framework for the study of regional security.

The central hypothesis of this article is that as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in Washington and New York, March 11, 2004 (11-M) in Madrid, and July 7 and 21 (7-J and 21-J) in London, both in North America and in the EU, security has developed into an important element of integration by becoming a catalyst for agreements oriented either to generate –as in North America– or to consolidate –as in the EU– regional identities in security matters which, together with institutions and mechanisms, are building security communities in both places.

This new enemy, terrorism, of the most powerful nations of the international system has forced them to reconsider their national security doctrines and redefine the threats not only to the state but to their civilizing vision. The values of tolerance and multicultural inclusion are being questioned and the design of defense strategies of their values and ethos forces them to implement global foreign policies that virtually securitizes their agendas, leading them to notions like preventive war, smart borders and new intelligence systems that successfully take on this state task.

The events of 9/11 put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a shared viewpoint, and a regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three countries recognize common security problems and the existence of transnational threats that cannot be treated independently. Given the increasing pressures to make U.S. homeland security more efficient and effective, and considering the long land borders shared with the United States, Mexico and Canada are currently in the process of assimilating this national security doctrine through the strategy for smart borders and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP).

In the case of Europe, although it is true that during the 1990s the EU developed its common security and defense foreign policy project, skepticism concerning its feasibility increased in the face of the lack of agreement and the break that the war in Iraq represented. However, as of December 2003, as a result of the

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1 When speaking of the “securitization” of the international agenda, we are referring both to the primacy of the issue of security and to the tendency to look at any issue through the lens of security. Krause defines “securitization” as “a process whereby particular issues are related to the sphere of day-to-day politics by specific groups of particular state elites who define them as security problems.” In this same sense, Barry Buzan considers that the different sectors of state activity can be turned into security issues by the decisions of the authorities (see Krause, cit. pos. Kirchner, 2004: 438; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).
European concern for reinforcing their multidimensional and multilateral vision of regional and international security, important agreements on the matter started to take form, a tendency that, no doubt, was bolstered after the 11-M attacks. From my own perspective, the European Constitution was signed because the consolidation of the EU became a security matter. That is, the European agenda became “securitized”, a situation that has sharpened since the July 7 and 21 attacks.

The empirical references about the construction of security communities in North America and the European Union clearly show that, even given their differences, the multidimensional security agenda is increasingly eclipsed by the agenda of the fight against terrorism, going so far as to threaten individual liberties, civil rights and even the privacy of the individual as has happened in the United States, Canada and the EU. Therefore, regionalism is faced with the challenge of preserving its security and at the same time promoting a development agenda in order to build a more stable world whose priorities go way beyond the fight against international terrorism.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE ABOUT SECURITY COMMUNITIES BUILDING

The Concept of Security
The predominance of the realist school in the explanation of security issues in international relations is a fact, and therefore security has traditionally been conceived based on the military-political focus centered on the viability and the preservation (survival) of the state. In this view, by definition, security “is and should be about the state, and the state is and should be about security, with the emphasis on military and political security” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 37), which creates an indissoluble dialectic between the state and security.

As a result, during the Cold War, studies about security were practically centered on matters related to the control, threat or use of force among States. Once the Cold War ended, intellectuals noted the need for broadening the traditional concept of security to include economic, environmental and social questions given that the nature of threats to security were changing to include international phenomena like organized crime, terrorist groups, multi-state or sub-national ethnic or religious movements, global matters like environmental deterioration or scarce resources and the growing importance of regions and institutions as new actors in security (Schultz et al., 1997).

The classic concept of security centered on the military vision, on the viability and safekeeping (survival) of the state, has evolved, giving rise to a broader concept by incorporating new elements, although the state continues to be the main reference point. From this perspective, security unfolds in several spheres: the mil-
itary (related to the offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their perceptions regarding the others’ intentions); the political (referring to state organization, adequate functioning of the institutions and their legitimacy/legality); the economic (related to access to the necessary resources, markets and finances to sustain the welfare of the population and state stability); the environmental (sustained development promotion); and the social (such as society’s ability to maintain cultural and national elements like language, religion and customs. See Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).

As Buzan indicates, in addition to meaning survival when the existence of the state or a society is threatened, security “has to do with conditions of existence and includes states’ ability to maintain their independent identity, their integrity and functionality against forces seen as hostile” (Buzan, 1991: 432). Threats would be defined as anything that undermines the stability, viability and existence of any sphere of security. Besides traditional threats centered on the state (like external military aggression), threats of a transnational character also arise from non-state actors like international organized crime, terrorism, drug and illegal arms traffickers, corruption, money laundering and the links among them.

**Classical Theories about International Security:**
**The Realism/Liberalism Debate**

As we have already pointed out, the realist school has dominated the explanation of security issues in international relations, an influence clearly reflected in the definitions of national and international security. Among the main characteristics of realism is situating the world as an anarchic system made up of States in a constant quest for maximizing their power and in a constant struggle to guarantee their security even at the expense of other states. In this way, the clashes (the conflict) that result from the competition among states are an intrinsic characteristic of international relations. Since there is no effective communication among states, the only way of seeking security is through military might (Baylis, 2004).

In this context, the concept of the “security dilemma” formulated by John Herz in 1950 is especially significant: “a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend regardless of intention to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening” (Baylis, 2004).

Using the basic postulates of realism, the structural realists (neo-realists) accept that cooperation among states can exist, but always within limits given that it is very difficult to sustain. For the neo-realists, the post-Cold War international system is characterized by mistrust and constant competition.
From the perspective of authors like Waltz and Mearsheimer, international institutions, the decisive underpinnings of the evolution of international relations, are puppets of the great powers with marginal effects on the level of regulating the behavior of state actors. From their perspective, the distribution of power in the international system is a basic element for understanding it. *Vis-à-vis* this perspective, Stephen Walt and Charles Glaser think it more important to take into consideration the level and type of threats to the existence of a state than the distribution of power (Brown et al., 1995).

Up until here, we have delineated the main postulates of the realist paradigm. From our perspective, given their conception about cooperation and international institutions (always conditioned by the power of states and by factors such as cheating and maximizing profits), and given their non-existent interest in the internal structures of states, this approach cannot explain the emergence of security communities in Europe and North America, even if we based ourselves on the premise that we are dealing with a strategy of a hegemonic state, like, for example, the United States, to maximize its power in the international theater. Simply, the tools that neo-realism can give us do not help us to explain the phenomenon.

In the case of the liberal paradigm for international relations, it is interesting to explore the postulates of liberal institutionalism that, developed by, among other authors, Keohane and Nye, accept the realist premise that the international system is anarchic and definitely lacks a central regulatory body where states as rational actors merely pursue their short-term interests. However, it does accept the possibility of peaceful change, the agents of which are international institutions (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1988 and 1989; Flemes, 2003).

According to Keohane and Martin, institutions facilitate cooperation to the extent that they provide information, reduce transaction costs, channel distribution conflicts and –most importantly– that they reduce the possibility for all actors of being cheated by the others. However, neo-liberal institutionalism also bestows only a limited importance on institutions with regard to tendencies for change in international relations, given that liberal neo-institutionalists share the basic premise of neo-realism that institutions reflect the distribution of power in the international system and are conditioned by it (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Flemes, 2003).

In addition, at the moment institutions are created, state actors are guided by their own interests, their strategies and aspirations. In that sense, it is worth asking whether international institutions can force national interests and identities considerably. While liberal neo-institutionalism jettisons some of neo-realism’s premises (the state as a single actor, power as the central motive), it continues to consider states’ self-interest as the maxim that guides their behavior. Even in the case in
which state actors guided by the principle of selfishness enter into institutionalized negotiations, in the last analysis anarchy as a determining condition of interstate relations cannot be overcome; the motives that lead to political cooperation that goes beyond the casual convergence of interests of state actors does not find a satisfactory explanation here (Flemes, 2003).

As we can observe, both paradigms come up against limitations when an attempt is made to analyze the links between regionalism and security and, consequently, the construction of identities, common values, institutions and regional mechanisms that can deal with the challenges to security on all levels (individual, local, state, regional and international). This is why it is necessary to explore new theoretical outlooks in order to overcome the limitations in the classical theories with regard to the regionalism-security relationship.

Regionalism and Security: The Construction of Security Communities

We know that optimal regional integration implies the consolidation of a common identity in matters of foreign policy, security and the harmonization of the administration of justice. Without a doubt, the transnational nature of the threats and challenges to domestic and international security has generated an ever greater interdependence among states in this matter.

In a framework of uncertainty, world change and securitization of agendas in which great inequality can be seen among the vast majority of countries and terrorist attacks are systemic, regionalism is emerging in the beginning of this millennium as the biggest option for the development and survival of the nation-state. Not only that, but it becomes the priority space for designing and promoting security since the threat from the potential old extra-territorial enemy has been replaced by that new enemy who penetrates and reproduces itself domestically (homeland security), whether through immigrants or generations of immigrants born on U.S. or European soil.

The transnational nature of the threats causes the interdependence of state security, making the regional the priority: political convergence and the will to cooperate among different states are indispensable for the region to reinforce its political-strategic character, thus reaffirming the geo-economic, geo-political and geo-strategic nature of integration. This has translated into the development of security communities, which later could translate into common identities, values, and perceptions of the threats and the way to deal with them.

Authors from the European School, like Waever and Buzan, have worked on the idea of security communities, developing the concept of regional security com-
plexes, through which they highlight the importance of the regions in structuring security levels. The regional security systems theory starts from an assessment guided by political realism of the international system’s anarchic nature and the interdependence among states in security matters. According to this vision, thanks to regional integration, we go from a group of anarchic states to stability when a single actor is constituted in the international system.

From that perspective, during the 1980s and 1990s, we saw the gradual emergence of a “mature anarchy” in which states recognized the immense damage that could be caused by a continued arms race and aggressive competition in a nuclear world. Thus, Buzan argues that there is growing recognition among “mature” states of interdependence in security matters and that there are therefore numerous (security) reasons to take into consideration the interests of neighboring states (Baylis, 2004).

According to Buzan, a regional security complex is made up of a group of states “whose main security perceptions and references are interconnected; therefore, they cannot be reasonably analyzed or solved some of them independently from others” and “whose securities are not sufficiently interdependent to render them a kind of subsystem within the general model of international security” (Buzan, 1990: 13-14).

The construction and dynamics of security systems are the result of the interdependence of their members, of the security perception each of them has, of the distribution of power among them and of the friendship-enmity relationships among them.

In this way, regional security systems may be built and may function based on: (a) the members’ negative vision, where interdependence arises from fear, distrust and rivalry; (b) an intermediate position, in which States perceive threats among themselves but reach agreements to reduce security problems amongst themselves and coming from abroad. This model corresponds to the beginnings of European Union construction; and (c) a positive vision, in which the states have no expectations or intentions of using force among themselves. This describes the development of security identity in North America (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).

Constructivism, for its part, considers many of the neo-realist premises valid, such as accepting the anarchic nature of the international system and that states, the main subject of study in international relations, generally have offensive capabilities, cannot be absolutely certain about the intentions of other states, have an innate desire for survival, and act rationally in the international system. However, in con-

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2 The term “constructivism” is used to describe an international relations research program that is an alternative to existing ones and was coined by Nicholas Onuf in 1989 in his work *World of Our Making*. This current’s most representative author is Alexander Wendt, who in 1987 put forward the central issue of the
trast with the neo-realists, who see the international structure as a result of the distribution of material capabilities, the constructivists consider the international structure a result of social structures constructed by different elements like knowledge, material resources, norms and practices. In consequence, they consider that the term “power policy” used by the neo-realists does not aid in describing interstate behavior, nor the fact that states are influenced in their international behavior by other ideas like respect for the law and the importance of cooperation via institutions (Baylis, 2004; Salomón, 2004).

In this way, the constructivists like Wendt or Katzenstein understand interstate cooperation as a social process that can lead to a new interpretation of security policy interests of the actors involved: the interactions among societies, the acceptance of common norms and the construction of a transborder identity generate cooperation among the states (Katzenstein, 1996; Flemes, 2003).

Basing themselves on the reflections of Karl Deutsch about security communities developed in the framework of the Cold War, Emmanuel Adler and Richard Barnett built their theoretical model about security communities focused on European construction. In this fashion, to completely understand the constructivist theoretical model of security communities, it is indispensable to refer to Deutsch’s thinking, among the first attempts after World War II to deal with the possibility of peaceful change in international relations. For Deutsch, states can overcome the basic condition of anarchy in international relations through state and social interaction, through processes of socialization that increasingly become transborder and through growing common identities (Flemes, 2003). Common perceptions and the construction of collective identities are agents for peaceful change. These processes explain why interdependence and mutual responsibility grow among states, which finally lead to no longer considering the use of physical violence among them as a legitimate conflict resolution mechanism (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

According to Deutsch, “A security community [...] is a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time” (Deutsch, 1961: 98).

Collective identities are the agents of pacific change, which explains why interdependence and mutual responsibility grow among states grow, finally leading to not considering the use of physical violence among them a legitimate mechanism for the resolution of conflicts (Flemes, 2003).

constructivist view: the mutual constitution of social structures and agents in international relations (see Salomón, 2004).
Basing themselves on Charles Tilly’s contribution to the study of communities, Adler and Barnett define the security community using three elements: (a) members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings; (b) those in a community have many sided and direct relations; and (c) communities exhibit reciprocity (expressing some degree of long-term interest derived from knowledge of those with whom one interacts) and perhaps even altruism (understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility. See Adler and Barnett, 1998).

A sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a political community that seems to offer protection from external threats (Clarke, 1993). Identity and security are relational concepts that imply the existence of an “other” against which the notion of a collective self and conditions of insecurity are articulated (Lipschutz, 1998). States identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. Identity implies a shared view about security, defense and threats and a close sense of cohesion and solidarity.

Adler and Barnett acknowledge that there is great skepticism about political actors being able to share values and standards and to come together in diverse and reciprocal interactions that reflect long-term interests. These authors distinguish between amalgamated security communities, characterized by the political merger of their members, toward which the EU is moving, and pluralistic security communities, in which the states maintain their independence and sovereignty, such as the case of North America (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

Also, they distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic security communities: the “loosely coupled” and the “tightly coupled”. While the loosely coupled security community has a minimal definition (a transnational region made up of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change, like NAFTA), the tightly coupled one is more demanding in two respects: (a) it has a “mutual aid” society in which collective security system arrangements are made; and (b) it possesses a regimen endowed with common supranational and transnational institutions and some form of a collective security system (like in the European case. See Adler and Barnett, 1998).

To explain how the development of a security community in general affects relations among the member states and in particular their security policies, the authors developed a security community model of evolution in three phases, which I shall use to analyze the development of the security communities in North America and in the European Union.

1) Nascent. The governments do not make an explicit effort to achieve the construction of a security community, “but they begin to consider how they
might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security; lower the transaction cost associated with their exchanges; and /or encourage further exchanges and interactions”. Transnational and interstate interactions are accompanied by the development of institutions and organizations both to increase the assurance and knowledge of the ‘other’” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 50).

2) Ascendant. This phase is characterized by “increasingly dense networks, new institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination or cooperation, cognitive structures that promote ‘seeing’ and acting together, and the deepening of the level of mutual trust.” Emerge of collective identities that encourage the expectation of peaceful change and of the development of mutual responsibility (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 51).

3) Mature. In this phase “regional actors share a security identity, as well as institutions and mechanisms to defend it, and entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” Security is perceived increasingly as a common good and a security community comes into existence (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 55).

THE EUROPEAN UNION: A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN CONSOLIDATION

The Europe of the 25 has established the objective of being heard with a single voice in international matters, by means of its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and defending itself in a communitarian manner from the new threats through an European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

At present, the European security community is clearly going from the ascendant stage to the consolidation stage as a result of the new impetus that EU members have given to security matters after 11-M, 7-J and 21-J and the challenges to border security involved in the expansion to the East.

The Beginning
Civilian by nature, the European integration process has led to a security community among European members. The disasters of World War II, the mutual perception of threat and the consensus on the need to reach agreements to reduce security problems among Europeans, as well as those coming from outside, were the main motivators for the gradual creation of a European identity in security matters.3

3 This effort has been in full effect since the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954. There is no doubt that the main objective of the founders of the European communities was to avoid another war
Nevertheless, after the failure of the European Defense Community in the early 1950s, the defense option disappeared from the European integration process for a long time. During the Cold War, European security, understood as the risk of a military attack by the Soviet countries, was left to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The first steps toward coordination in matters of foreign policy were taken after the Davignon Report, in 1970. The Single European Act of 1986 formalized the system of consultations and coordination, and gave rise to intergovernmental, voluntary, not obligatory, foreign policy cooperation, with insufficient treatment of security and a total absence of defense issues.

**The Ascending Stage**

Although at the end of the Cold War the European Economic Community started to appear as a first-rate actor in international economic matters, in political and military matters it maintained a very low profile, as seen during the first Gulf War in 1991 and the wars of the Balkans. The development of a common European position in foreign policy and security matters corresponded to the economic leadership role that the EU was playing. The security debate in what was then the European Community tended toward recognizing the need to reinforce the system of cooperation among member nations to include communication, information exchange and the development of common principles, standards and regulations to prevent any aggressive behavior and to provide the basis for collective action, conflict prevention, crisis negotiations and the peaceful solution of controversies (Gärtner, Hyde-Price and Reiter, 2001).

Added to the classic view of security, focused on political and military matters dealing with the defense of national territory, were concerns about human rights,

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4 In the case of the Gulf War, following a United Nations Security Council resolution, the military intervention was carried out by the United States and was paid for by Japan and the European Economic Community. With respect to the war in what was then Yugoslavia, it is important to note that the conflict was solved after eight years by a U.S. military intervention within the framework of the NATO, and that it did not have UN approval.
the environment, political stability, democracy, social development, cultural and religious identity, as well as immigration issues. This gave rise to a series of discussions on the definition of the concept of security.

During the 1990s, the development of a common approach to foreign policies, security and defense, made important progress, thus entering into its ascending stage, such as the strengthening of bonds, the creation of new institutions and the establishment of a European security corps (Europol and Eurocorps).

In 1993, the European Union’s Treaty of Maastricht established the CFSP as a second pillar of the union. The incorporation of the concept of common defense and the creation of the post of CFSP High Representative would come with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which went into effect in 1999. In that same year, the Cologne Summit was held, where it was agreed that the European Union should absorb the military powers of the Western European Union upon the development of the Rapid Reaction Forces (Eurocorps).

As a result of the European Councils of Helsinki (1999) and of Santa Maria de Feira (2000), the members of the European Union established commitments for improving EU military capacity and carrying out crisis negotiations missions. The permanent political and military structures within the council (the Political and Security Committee [COPS], the European Military Committee and the European Military Staff) were established in the Summit of Nice in 2001. This summit agreed that the European Union would absorb the functions of the Western European Union (WEU), searching for the establishment of decision-making mechanisms in accordance with the development of autonomous military capacities (the develop-

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5 France and Germany agreed it would be made up of between 50 000 and 60 000 troops and France and Great Britain set the year 2003 as the deadline for them to be ready.

6 Consisting of ambassadors of each member state meeting twice a week in Brussels. Its function is to manage developing crises, organize evaluation and planning and give political advice to the European Council. In the event of the deployment of union military forces, it assumes political control of the day-to-day leadership of military operations.

7 Officially made up of chiefs of defense staff of member countries but in practice attended by their military delegates. It is the most senior military body and a forum for consultation and cooperation among member states, and is responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the COPS and the European Council, and issuing military directives to the European Military Staff.

8 Responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg missions, including the earmarking of national and international European forces. It gives military support to the European Military Committee during the strategic planning phase of crisis management situations for the complete range of Petersberg missions and develops working methods and operational concepts based on or compatible with those of NATO.

9 Their own force of 60 000, capable of deploying in 60 days and remaining deployed for a year, ready by 2003, in which all the states, except Denmark, would participate. “According to the ‘catalogue of forces’, the 60 000 troops would be backed by 100 000 more, approximately 400 combat plans and 100 land facilities. The force would be militarily autonomous and would have the capabilities of command, control and intelligence. It would have logistic units and, during combat operations, would combine elements of the air and sea forces. The member states also agree on cooperating by improving their intelligence capabilities and air and sea transportation.”
ment of the Rapid Reaction Force), enabling the union to respond to the St. Petersburg missions (Gärtner, Hyde-Price and Reiter, 2001).10

Also decided at Nice was the creation of autonomous agencies that would incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with CFSP, like the Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies. These two agencies were officially created by European Council Joint Actions in July 2001.

However, the debates among European Union members concerning its nature, the European inability to deal with the Balkans problem, the incorporation of the Eastern countries into NATO, and, above all, the European break with respect to the conflict of Iraq in the midst of the United Nations and NATO all proved that the European Union was far from reaching a true identity in security matters, due to its incapacity to carry out independent, common military action. Apparently, after the first moments of euphoria, the construction of the CFSP followed a course with ups and downs that seemed to condemn it to failure.

The differences with regard to relations with NATO may be a clear example of the differences inside the EU about security and defense. In the framework of the so-called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) inside NATO, the differences between Europeanists and Atlanticists could be clearly seen: while Great Britain called for cooperation and complementary action between the ESDP and NATO, France and Germany argued that cooperation could only be achieved once Europe developed its own defense capabilities.11 In consequence, the ESDI “never became an alternative to NATO since all the European actors, including France, have been reluctant to replace U.S. military leadership” (Arteaga, 1999: 33).

Finally, European clashes over the Iraq conflict demonstrated the limitations and inconsistencies of the CFSP, showing that community action in matters of foreign policy, security and defense continued to be an ideal to the extent that the EU’s member states made their decisions based on their own interests, this time clearly defined as a function of their alliance with the United States and not as a function of European identity and construction.

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10 Humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping missions and combat force missions for crisis negotiations, including civilian aspects of four kinds: police, strengthening of the rule of law, reinforcement of civil administration and civil protection. These forces shall be based on the Eurocorps and shall imply greater expenses and responsibilities for the states in the area of defense.

11 After 1991, the concept of ESDI was developed as the European pillar inside NATO in order to develop capabilities different from but not separate from NATO, identify assets, capabilities, planning mechanisms and command structures in the North Atlantic alliance that could be used by European allies in response to crises of peace missions, completing them with Joint/Combined Operational Forces, seeking the establishment of mobile, self-sufficient general headquarters that could be deployed on short notice in the area of operations. The ESDI was reinforced in Washington in 1999 with the establishment of the Defense Capabilities Initiative designed for joint operations by the states and to modernize allied capabilities for dealing with new security challenges. The idea is that the ESDI would play a dual role by becoming the EU’s defensive component and taking charge of Europe’s participation in NATO in order to avoid duplicating efforts.
Encouragement for Consolidation: From the Iraq War to 11-M.
The “Securitization” of the European Agenda

From the War in Iraq to 11-M: The Accords about the Constitution
The Iraq crisis produced a common awareness among Europe’s leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues. There is also the general recognition that a divided Europe is powerless (Haine, 2005).

During the discussions on the draft Constitution, one of the main accords reached among members was precisely related to EU security and defense policy, thereby commencing the healing of the break opened with the conflict in Iraq (Chanona, 2004).

In an Intergovernmental Conference held in Naples, Italy, in December 2003, EU members agreed to work out a common view on European defense based on the development of military capabilities (by creating a European Armament, Research and Military Capabilities Agency) and complementariness with NATO, thereby overcoming the old rivalries between pro-Allies and pro-Europeans.

According to the text of the draft Constitution, approved in Brussels, the EU “shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ actions,” and, “before undertaking any action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council of Ministers” (European Convention, 2003: art. 39).

Moreover, the Constitution states that the common security and defense policy “shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military” to which they may resort “on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter” (European Convention, 2003: art. 40).

Notable among the accords in that regard is the solidarity clause12 and the approval of a rider protocol referring to the development of combat units13 and

12 The solidarity clause is contained in article 42 of the draft Constitution: “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack, and assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster.”

13 It was agreed that by the year 2007, the EU shall have combat units organized on the basis of a tactical plan as a combat formation with the support elements, including logistical transport. These units will
incorporating the concept of “structured cooperation” under which those countries who wish to may go further than the rest in this respect, as they did at the time of the single currency or the Schengen space for removing borders, undertaking to meet a series of conditions as soon as the future Constitution enters into effect (slated for 2006), such as developing greater military capabilities and participating, if necessary, in multinational forces, as well as taking part in the European programs for the development of military equipment and in the European Armament Agency (El Mundo, 2003).14

Another important element in the consolidation of the security community in Europe is, without a doubt, the ESDP operations. Numerous analysts have said that the operability of the ESDP became a reality in 2003 when more than 2,000 European police and military participated in four operations: the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Operation Artemisa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a second police mission, Proxima in FYROM.

Clearly, March 11 will be remembered by all of us as Europe’s day of terror. The Madrid train attacks marked a watershed in the European process: they shook the whole of Europe, renewing the enthusiasm for the Constitution. Unity is now an element of security—a weapon against terrorism. The driving force behind the approval of the European Constitution was determined by the importance of security for Europe after 11-M.

The 11-M attacks have encouraged most countries to give a sign of unity and progress in the European construction process. In point of fact, the central themes of the Brussels Council meeting held March 25 and 26, 2004, were terrorism and the Constitution, even though the gathering’s main topic was supposed to have been the revision of the Lisbon Strategy, regarding the union’s economic development. Hence, the contents of the agenda that will allow the union to become the most dynamic economic region by 2010 were subsumed under the issue of security, specifically terrorism. The March 25, 2004 declaration on combating terrorism and the establishment of a counter-terrorism coordinator give the impression that the union’s

have to be able to maintain themselves by their own means for an initial period of 30 days, extendable to at least 120.

14 Each country that wishes to join the European defense initiative will have to meet certain requirements, such as being able to deploy 1,500 soldiers so that they will be available in just 10 days at a distance of 4,000 kilometers and stay there for a period of between 30 and 120 days. Currently, these conditions are only met by four member states: the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany. The other members of the EU have until 2007 to develop their capabilities. Furthermore, participating states will have to spend an as-yet-unspecified amount on military equipment, which will have to be harmonized and inter-operative, without prejudice to their NATO commitments.
work in the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime is entering a new era.

Thus, the forward thrust of the consolidation of the EU security community is determined by the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid and July 7 and 21, 2005 in London. While the attacks on the trains in Madrid were a watershed in the European process because they shook all of Europe, renewing enthusiasm about the Constitution because of the idea that unity was a matter of security, the attacks on London unleashed member states’ greater political determination to advance in building the community, with Islamic terrorism seen as the main threat to be combated, which may at the same time be a threat against the broader vision of (multi-dimensional) security that the EU had been championing during its integration process.

The European Definition of Security and Threats

The EU continues to build its security identity concept based on the liberal institutionalism paradigm anchored in an institutional structure of laws and cooperation, substituting the struggle for power by placing the priority on diplomacy, cooperation and international law and by paying attention to the importance of the non-military dimensions of security. In that vein, the European model is betting on the construction of a stable world via the utilization of cooperation instruments for developing and promoting human rights.15

In the December 12, 2003 Council of Brussels meeting, the text of the first European Security Strategy, drawn up by CFPS High Representative Javier Solana, was approved. For the first time, the EU identified the threats to its security and the lines of defense that it will put forward.

The threats were identified using the multidimensional concept of security; hence poverty, pandemics and competition for natural or energy resources were incorporated along with terrorism, international organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts such as the Middle East.

As for the lines of defense, the document states that the EU must develop the capacity to send missions to distant places and contribute to international security by exercising effective multilateralism, international cooperation and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. Also, the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is

15 One example of this are the 500 million euros contributed yearly since 1996 to Latin America, an amount that represents 45 percent of the development resources sent to the region, and the 106 million euros supplied in 2002 to projects in the framework of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights, whose objective is to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
ratified and a commitment to develop prevention is established: Europe, Solana stated, “should be capable of implementing the full spectrum of its political and economic instruments, as well as its member states, to launch diplomatic initiatives, to conduct civilian, police or military operations, before countries around us deteriorate, before humanitarian emergencies arise or when signs of proliferation are detected” (Solana, 2003a).

The EU security strategy clearly states that the EU and its member states will tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions and the respect for international law. The strategy stressed that Europe can no longer remain hesitant and divided if it is to meet the promise of its origins, as a community of democracies interested in building a stable regional security community, in its external relations. It argued that active engagement is also in Europe’s security interests since these are affected by poor governance, insecurity, poverty and conflicts far beyond its borders. Europe must therefore meet these challenges, which it is well placed to do with a range of diplomatic, development, economic, humanitarian and military instruments (Solana, 2003b).

The EU has three key strategic objectives in applying its external instruments to meet contemporary security challenges:

(a) Extending the security zone on Europe’s periphery through the creation of a “ring of friends” around Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Based on a series of shared values such as democracy and human rights, the EU fosters a market and open border policy, as well as the strengthening of cooperation in areas like research, transportation, energy, conflict prevention and strengthening the rule of law. This strategy, whose ultimate end is to guarantee the area’s stability, includes the possibility of rapid troop deployment, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, reinforcing the rule of law and economic aid.

United Nations operations during 2003 were the result of this strategy: the European Union Police Missions in Bosnia and Concordia and Proxima in the Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.

(b) Supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, particularly an effective multilateral system; through its active participation in the reform of the United Nations and the international financial agencies, and

(c) Seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats (Haine, 2004).
However, the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid (and July 7 and 21 in London have been watersheds in the European conception of security. At the same time that it fosters unity and validates the idea that common focuses on security and defense must be developed, the European Union has redefined its threats: Islamic terrorism is now the main threat to European security. Unfortunately, signs are beginning to appear that the EU might be abandoning its broader vision of multidimensional security in favor of the fight against Islamic terrorism on a regional and global level.

**The Fight against Terrorism: A New Priority on the European Agenda**

For years Europe has been the victim of terrorism by groups like the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader Meinholf gang in Germany, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)\(^\text{16}\) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. Since 1979, when the first Police Working Group on Terrorism was set up, the EU has recognized that terrorism is a transnational problem necessarily requiring cooperation among states to be dealt with. In the current international system, conflict, understood as a war between two states, has been transformed into a fight against organizations, small groups who act outside state control and who challenge the stability of states and their national security systems.

Following the events of 9/11, the extraordinary European Council of September 21, 2001 stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms and that “the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective for the EU.” Among other things, the EU undertook to strengthen cooperation among the authorities in charge of combating terrorism (i.e. Europol and Eurojust and the police services). In the European Council meeting at Laeken, the member states undertook to strengthen cooperation between the expert services in the fight against terrorism and to find a common definition of terrorist crimes. In June 2002, the Seville European Council approved a framework decision aimed at harmonizing member states’ legislations, establishing minimum standards on sentencing.

Although solidarity with the United States was complete, even including support for the invasion of Afghanistan in the United Nations, the differences about the ways to combat terrorism emerged with the war in Iraq, opposed by France and Germany, creating a break both in NATO and in Europe.

However, the nature and perception of terrorism changed since the Madrid and London attacks, after which the EU has stated that Islamic terrorism\(^\text{17}\) is the

\(^{16}\) Euskadi Ta Askatasuna means “Basque Country and Freedom” in Basque.

\(^{17}\) The term Islamic terrorism refers to terrorist acts practiced by a vast group of organizations and tendencies who are followers of Islam and tend to articulate, one way or another, religion and politics. The
main threat to its security, bringing it closer to the vision of security the United States has championed since 9/11.

Given the demand for responses to the terrorist threat by organizations like Al-Qaeda, after the 11-M terrorist attacks, community leaders approved the strategic plan designed by the justice ministers on March 19, 2004, which includes a series of responses such as strengthening cooperation in intelligence and measures for sharing up international policing activities, improving measures for freezing accounts linked to suspicious groups and giving priority to the care of victims of extremism.

CFPS High Representative Javier Solana stated:

One priority is better intelligence-sharing. More information must be exchanged more quickly [...we] must implement fully and without delay legislative measures such as the European arrest warrant [...] accelerate the strengthening of border controls and document security. And we must look again at our existing curbs on the financing of terrorism (Solana, 2004).

Furthermore, the Heads of State created the post of the European counter-terrorism coordinator, appointing Gijs de Vries, a former Dutch interior minister, who acts under the instructions of Javier Solana. In June 2004, Solana announced that internal security services are to provide intelligence on terrorism to the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), part of the EU’s emerging military structure. At the same time he revealed that the external intelligence agencies had been cooperating with SitCen since early 2002. These moves were clearly needed since attempts to bring together meaningful intelligence on terrorism through Europol were doomed to failure: internal security and external intelligence agencies are loath to share information with police agencies (Müller, 2003).

In November 2004, the EU Council approved The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union to respond jointly to the challenges of terrorism, illegal migration and international organized crime, guaranteeing at the same time respect for individual rights and freedoms and underlining the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility among member states. The program

__jihad__ or “Holy War” is the effort to extend the sovereignty of Muslim power. However, it must be said: Islam is not responsible for terrorism. The East and the West are undoubtedly two different cultures, two different world views, but that does not mean that they necessarily must be enemies to the death who generate violence and war, when it is proven that the marginalization caused by the world economic system and the use and abuse of power in the interest of the few are what have detonated a great many of humanity’s conflicts. Islam is a form of rethinking the Western identity and its place in the world to the point of the idea taking root that the West is only one more civilization among others. See Sayyid, 1997.
puts special emphasis on strengthening the EU’s external borders through the joint creation and establishment of biometric and police control in order to safeguard community security.

In order to achieve optimal exchange of information among Europeans, the Program incorporates the “principle of availability” which foresees the possibility that by the year 2008 any state agency requiring some kind of information from another member state can obtain it (European Council, 2004).

Finally, in a December 2004 meeting of the European Council, the 25 members of the European Union committed themselves to encourage judicial collaboration, intelligence services, border security and the struggle against the financing of terrorism. The council also approved a Global Action Plan against Terrorism during 2005.

Despite the national and community efforts to prevent another attack like 11-M, London was hit by terrorism on July 7 and 21, 2005. Europe’s reaction to this new onslaught has been prompt, once again putting the issue of the fight against terrorism front and center on the European agenda as a priority. In accordance with the Declaration of the Extraordinary Session of the Justice and Internal Affairs Council, held July 13 in Brussels, the EU considers this attack by Islamic terrorism an assault on the universal values upon which European construction is based, such as the commitment to democracy, the rule of law and cultural pluralism. For this reason, they once again agreed to take the actions necessary to fight terrorism, maintaining respect for freedom, security and justice (European Union, 2005).

However, the measures for safeguarding European territory could go the other way. In addition to reinforcing border surveillance, deciding to “shoot to kill” any terrorist suspect and proposing to increase the maximum time of incommunicado detention stipulated by the anti-terrorist law from 15 days to three months, England has proposed that the EU control Internet and cell phones. France decided to step up surveillance along its borders and legislate about anti-terrorism, while the Italian government announced that in the case of terrorist attack, the army will assume police functions (meanwhile soldiers are empowered to set up highway checkpoints, identify suspects and conduct searches and confiscate different items).

Another important aspect of the 7-J and 21-J attacks is that they were carried out by immigrants living in the country who joined extremist Islamic groups, thus opening up a greater challenge for European democracies. How can tolerance and pluralism be maintained? How can young immigrants be prevented from seeing terrorism as a form of protest against marginalization, as a war?

While this concern is reflected in several EU documents when they state the importance of preventing people from turning to terrorism, locating the factors that
contribute to radicalization and the recruitment to terrorist groups, the strategies for achieving this have not been defined. We know that France announced the scheduling of joint flights with Spain and Germany to expel illegal immigrants, but this is not a real solution for the problem. Factors like the growth of the migrant population, religious radicalism and high unemployment had already established themselves in the European collective consciousness as sources of new tensions, something which becomes more serious with the terrorist attacks on Madrid and London.

Immigration and Border Control
Regional integration in the EU has been accompanied by the reinforcement of closing borders to illegal immigration. Population growth, political instability, religious radicalism and the high unemployment rate have become sources of new tensions. Border surveillance has become increasingly important after the expansion toward the East: in addition to the increase in migratory pressure, authorities fear terrorists and members of the mafias and organized crime from Eastern Europe and Russia will enter the EU.

The European Union defines immigration as one of the dangers to combat, together with drug trafficking and organized crime. In general terms, EU states’ immigration policies and strategies are based on three points: control of residents, expulsion of persons with irregular or illegal migratory status and border control.

The Treaty of Amsterdam conferred powers on the community in matters of migration and asylum. In 2000 and 2001, several bills were proposed or adopted for developing a common policy on asylum and migration by 2004 at the latest.

The aim of community policy regarding EU external borders is to set up integrated management ensuring a high and uniform level of checks on persons and surveillance as a prerequisite for establishing an area of freedom, security and justice.

In its May 2002 communication entitled “Towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union”, the commission advocated setting up an “external borders practitioners’ common unit” tasked with managing operational cooperation on the external borders of member states. The plan for managing the external borders of EU member states agreed by the council on June 13, 2002 endorsed setting up an external borders practitioners’ common unit as a means of establishing integrated management of the external borders.

18 This idea appears both in the Hague Programme and in the declaration from July 13, 2005 meeting of the Justice and Internal Affairs Council.
Within the framework of the Thessalonica Summit held in June 2003, European Union heads of state agreed on a series of projects to reinforce the fight against illegal immigration with a system of visas, collaboration with sending countries and greater border control. To do this, the creation of the European Agency for the Management of External Borders was proposed, with joint financing of actions fostering security along the European Union’s external borders.

Finally, the European Agency for the Management of External Borders began operations January 1, 2005. The new agency’s mission will be to facilitate the application of existing and future community measures concerning management of the EU’s external borders by coordinating member states’ actions to implement them.\(^{19}\)

However, in the framework of the migratory crisis that Spain and Holland have gone through in recent months, the agency’s activities have been harshly criticized by those who think it still does not have the necessary resources, nor the political will of the members to coordinate with each other and protect the EU’s external borders, especially with regard to undocumented immigration, considered today one of the main threats to European stability and security. In that context, on October 27, 2005, at an informal summit at Hampton Court, Europe’s leaders gave their support to an integral plan to control illegal immigration presented by Rodríguez Zapatero. This plan’s aims are: (a) more effective, integral control of external borders; (b) concluding EU accords for the readmission of immigrants who arrived illegally from their home countries; (c) incorporating policies to support immigration in community relations both with EU neighboring countries and immigrants’ home countries, and (d) broadening cooperation for the development of sub-Saharan Africa so it can resolve its own problems (Egurbide, 2005).

Another aspect that should be considered is, given the possibility of being the target for terrorist attacks like those in London and Madrid, the risk that EU mem-

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19 The main tasks of the agency are: (a) to coordinate operational cooperation between member states regarding surveillance and control of the external borders; (b) to develop a common integrated risk assessment model and prepare general, or specific, risk assessments; (c) to help member states train their national border guards by providing European-level training, holding seminars and offering additional training to competent authorities; (d) to follow developments in research into the control and surveillance of external borders (e.g. research into detection systems for illegal immigrants concealed in cars, trucks or trains, etc.); (e) to assist member states in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at their external borders: this may involve deploying experts on control and border surveillance or providing technical equipment. It should be noted that experts on secondment would not have any law-enforcement powers in the member states to which they were seconded and that the specific situations identified in the regulation would not cover a massive, temporary inflow of nationals from third countries; and (f) to coordinate operational cooperation among member states regarding the removal of third-country nationals residing illegally in the member states: the agency would provide the member states with the necessary technical assistance, for example by setting up a network of contact points, by keeping an up-to-date inventory of existing and available resources and facilities or by preparing specific guidelines and recommendations on joint return operations.
bers could decide to close their borders to persons from the Schengen region, as France did after the London attacks. However, the political will to protect the community space has prevailed in the framework of the consolidation of the EU security community. As a result, from the perspective of European leaders, the construction of a space of freedom, security and justice in the EU implies strengthening trust among EU members, increasing the fight against clandestine migration, intensifying the fight against terrorism and surveillance of the union’s external borders.

The European Defense Agency
Given the traditional divergences among member states on armaments issues, the establishment of a European Defense Agency in less than two years is an impressive achievement.

On June 2003, the European Council at Thessalonica, Greece instructed appropriate council bodies to undertake the necessary actions in 2004 to create an intergovernmental agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. On November 17, the EU Council decided to create an Agency Establishment Team to prepare the establishment of an agency.

Finally, the Second Meeting of the European Agency’s Steering Board, held on November 24, 2004, approved the agency’s first annual budget (20 million) and the annual work program. The agency achieved “operational” status by the end of the year and has four functions: (a) defense capabilities development; (b) armaments cooperation; (c) the European defense technological and industrial base and defense equipment market; and (d) research and technology (European Union, November 22, 2004).

Has NAFTA been a Nascent Pluralistic Security Community since 9/11?

North American integration undoubtedly has peculiar characteristics, such as the asymmetry among its members, the clear hegemony of the United States and the pre-eminence of bilateral relations (United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) over trilateral ones. North America has become a real region due to reasons of security, economic advantages and political interests, generating the idea of consolidating a North American Community by deepening NAFTA (Chanona, Roy and Dominguez, 2004).

The events of 9/11 put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a shared viewpoint, and that regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three countries recognize common problems regarding security and the existence of
transnational threats that cannot be treated independently, although it is true they have opted for paused, thematic, practical and immediate work at a bilateral level (United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) encouraged by the United States’ immediate needs.

We can argue that in North America, a pluralistic security community, understood as a transnational region formed by sovereign states that maintain expectations of pacific changes, is being developed (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The regional security system in North America will be built starting from mutual confidence and interdependence (what Buzan calls “positive vision”), but it will respond, in principle, to the United States’ immediate needs: safeguarding U.S. territory, especially from a potential terrorist attack.

In North America, the differentiated use the United States makes of its hegemony is clear: when dealing with regions like Africa or the Middle East it has favored, and even carried out, actions, unilaterally exercising its military strength, whereas with its North American partners it has successfully moved toward the search for plans to cooperate, generating channels for dialogue in an effort to reach viable agreements. Mexico and Canada have taken advantage of this in negotiations in order to prevent the unilateral measures of U.S. hegemony from affecting vital areas such as trade and personal life, due to the virtual closing of the borders.20

Historically, Canada21 and Mexico22 have designed their national sovereignty and survival principles without disputing U.S. hegemony, although they tend to remain distant with respect to certain regional or hemisphere questions when their independence is at stake. Mexico and Canada share some positions like the multidimensional concept of security, the promotion of multilateralism or the struggle against antipersonnel land mines.

Canada’s North American identity is firmly established, and it clearly recognizes U.S. leadership in the region. For the United States, Canada is a trustworthy

20 However, Mexico-U.S. relations have been under high tension recently. Condoleezza Rice’s announcement, Tony Garza’s letter to the Mexican government and the CIA director’s statement about the possibility of political and social instability during the coming presidential campaign have caused a lot of trouble for the Mexican government.

21 Traditionally, Canada has determined its defense strategy taking into account at least five points: 1) Canada defines itself as “non-militarist”, preferring peaceful means for solving controversies; 2) Canadian strategy does not develop the classic elements of self-sufficiency in defense matters; 3) the role of the Canadian armed forces is to support internal bodies, that is, the army’s objectives are not only military; 4) Canada is aware of the need for strong cooperation with the United States in matters of defense, due to its geographic location; and 5) Canada designs its defense policy without autonomy vis-à-vis U.S. defense policy (Murray, 1994).

22 Historically, Mexico’s security and defense policies have been nationalist and defensive. Throughout the twentieth century it has developed its foreign policies based on the principles of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of states and international law, thus maintaining its diplomatic independence in the international realm and at the same time protecting its special relation with the United States.
partner. Relations between the United States and Canada in security and defense matters have historically been characterized by proximity and cooperation, as demonstrated by the more than 80 agreements about defense that the two countries have signed (although they maintain some differences such as the position on Cuba and the conception of human security, one of the principal axes of Canadian foreign policy).

What is more ambiguous is Mexico’s North American identity. This country has been part of the North America concept only for the last decade, an identity ratified with the signing of NAFTA. At present, no matter what issue we analyze within the context of Mexico-U.S. relations, national security predominates in relation to all the matters of high politics.

In security matters, the most complete representation of the construction of a North American bloc is seen in the smart border agreements and in the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). They go far beyond the technical aspects that supposedly support them and imply collaboration in intelligence and migration policies that guarantee security in the territorial proximity of the United States, which enables it to project its military power to the rest of the world.

A Shared North American Point of View about Security and Threats?

Although there is no shared vision of the North American countries on security and the threats to it, we can find minimum agreements in the matter derived from the United States’ immediate needs, such as the importance of border security and the struggle against international organized crime, specifically terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, recognized by Mexico and Canada as threats to their security.

After the events of 9/11, the United States initiated a new security doctrine that for the first time centers its attention on the security and defense of its territory (homeland security and homeland defense), restructuring its domestic and international systems to deal with non-conventional threats to its security, specifically terrorism. Homeland security implies the prevention, prediction of, elimination and defense

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23 Historically, Canada has maintained cooperative relations in security matters with its southern neighbor. Mechanisms like the North America Defense Treaty, the Bilateral Consultant Group on Cooperation against Terrorism, the Terrorist Interception Program of both countries (TIP), the United States and Canada Forum on Transborder Crime, the groups directed by the immigration service and customs known as Border Vision and the information exchange agreements between the United States Drug Control Administration and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are proof of this close cooperation. The Bilateral Consultation Group for Antiterrorist Cooperation has coordinated efforts in the struggle against terrorism. The establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee of Ministers in Public Security and Antiterrorism, presided over by Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley, and the approval of the Antiterrorist Act, in September and December 2001, respectively, were clear signs of the Canadian commitment to the antiterrorist struggle.
against any aggression to the territory, sovereignty, population and infrastructure of the United States, as well as the management of crises and other national emergencies, which the new National Territory Security Office will be in charge of.

The new U.S. military doctrine is not based on nuclear threats but rather on a measure of the military capacity to prevent and react against any unexpected threat or attack. In this doctrine, what the United States accepts is the new nature of its enemies. Terrorists are not afraid of nuclear dissuasion; as a result, the country has developed new forms and more effective means of dissuading.

The new strategy contained in the Unified Command Plan is based on the awareness of all the weak points in the U.S. defense system, such as the lack of a defense system against ballistic missiles, which constitutes in itself an initiative for the development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to start them (Rumsfeld, 2002).

The United States has identified terrorism as the main threat against its security, together with the traditional transnational threats such as organized crime and drug trafficking. The United States has insisted at international meetings that issues like poverty, pandemics and the environment, among others, are not part of the security agenda, due to the fact that they “debase” the concept of security.

Canada and Mexico’s perceptions about their security and threats to it coincide to the extent that both countries subscribe to its multi-dimensional character. Since the 1990s, the Canadians have emphasized the dimension of individual security, and therefore one of the characteristics of Canadian foreign policy has been to promote human security.24

Based on the recognition that terrorism is not the only security risk on a national, regional and world level, in April 2004, the Canadian government announced the document Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, a strategic framework and plan of action for ensuring the country’s security.

In this document, the Canadian government points to three vital interests in matters of security: 1) protecting Canada and Canadians both inside and outside their territory; 2) ensuring allied countries that Canada is not a base for threats against them;25

24 Since the 1980s, studies on security paid more attention to the individual, using the concept of human security, promoting a multidimensional understanding of the term including matters such as the environment, social development, extreme poverty and pandemics like HIV/aids. In 1993, the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP) coined the concept of human security which was extensively expanded in the 1994 Human Development Report. According to the UNDP, the concept of human security has two main components: (a) safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression, and (b) protection against sudden or violent changes in one’s way of life. Human security includes seven categories: economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal and community security. Proponents insist that the concept of security urgently needs to be changed in two ways: from an exclusive focus on territorial security to greater emphasis on individuals’ security, and from security through arms to security through human development.

25 This means making the allies secure in the knowledge that Canada does not harbor terrorists who could plan attacks from its territory and that it can control other kinds of threats to international security.
and 3) contributing to international security. With regard to security threats, terrorism occupies first place, followed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international espionage, natural disasters, the vulnerability of strategic infrastructure, organized crime and, finally, pandemics, excluding poverty and migration from the list (Canadian Government, 2004).

In the case of Mexico, according to the 2000-2006 National Development Plan, “The main objectives of national security are to ensure the protection and conservation of the collective interest, avoiding as far as possible or minimizing any risk or threat to the physical integrity of the population and to institutions.”

Ratifying the multidimensional vision of security, the National Development Plan points out that “the real threats to institutions and national security are poverty and inequality, the vulnerability of the population faced with natural disasters, environmental destruction, criminality, organized crime and illegal drug trafficking [...] At present the Mexican State is not aware of any risks to its sovereignty as a result of external threats of the traditional type.”

However, in its National Security Law, published in the Diario Oficial (Official Gazette), January 31, 2005, Mexico defines its national security as “the actions immediately and directly aimed at maintaining the integrity, stability and permanence of the Mexican state”, referring solely to the preservation of democratic institutions and leaving aside the multidimensional aspects of security that had been recognized in the National Development Plan. The law also recognizes terrorism, organized crime and trafficking in chemical, biological and conventional weapons of mass destruction, among others, as threats to national security, bringing its vision of security threats closer to that of Mexico’s North American partners (National Security Law, 2005).

In this way, faced with Mexico’s and Canada’s multidimensional security considerations, the U.S. hegemonic vision emerges and, with a reading of the international system based on political realism, sustains that the construction of worldwide security and the defense of the liberal order rests on the exercise of power and military might, preferring coercion and unilateralism.

Nevertheless, Mexico’s case is special. In addition to the primary U.S. concern about security on the border with Mexico and the porosity of the country’s southern border, the U.S. is also worried about the country’s internal security and stability. As Dziedzic points out, “Mexico has become a point of contention for various geo-social or transnational problems that do not respect national borders […] That

Dziedzic understands “geo-social” problems as the new transnational threats to security. They include international organized crime, terrorist groups, environmental pollution and the massive flow of refugees and disease.
is why Mexico is—and shall continue being—fundamental for the success of the great United States strategy” (Dziedzic, 1997).

The security agenda for Mexico designed by the Bush administration includes: 

(a) traffic in immigrants; 

(b) widespread corruption (which would potentially allow terrorist groups to set up in Mexico); 

(c) organized crime (drug trafficking, kidnapping, thefts); 

(d) the lack of maritime control on Mexico’s borders; 

(e) the possibility of a terrorist attack on strategic points in Mexico, especially the oil wells (Benítez and Sánchez, 2004).

As a result, we can say that the countries of North America recognize certain common, international threats that require cooperation to be dealt with (particularly terrorism and traffic in drugs, persons and arms), without this meaning that the views are identical in the sense of sharing a common vision about security, the threats and the defense of a broader vision. This means that there are a series of minimum agreements that have made the birth of a security community possible, understood as the development of mechanisms and the recognition of mutual responsibility for guaranteeing regional security without necessarily being a full-fledged identity.

The agreements on smart borders were undoubtedly the first step for the creation of a North American Security Community, which has entered into a new stage since the March 2005 Waco, Texas meeting that decided that the three countries would promote a security perimeter in the region through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). In the meeting’s final declaration, North America’s leaders committed themselves to developing a common focus on security issues, reaffirming the international character of the threats and pointing, once again, to terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and traffic in persons as common threats.

Toward a North American Security Perimeter: 
Borders and Cooperation as Key Issues

**Smart Borders: The First Step for the Security Community in North America**

The borders are key areas for U.S. security. In both cases, United States-Mexico and United States-Canada, priorities are different. Whereas in the United States-Canada relationship, drug trafficking has dominated the agenda, in the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, together with drugs, migration is a binational security matter.

**NAFTA** has increased illegal transborder interactions; this may be attributed to trade itself and to deficiencies in U.S. drug detection policies along the Mexican border. The debate between trade liberalization and more policing was made more flexible in order to not restrict trade growth on the border.
The numbers speak for themselves: annually, an estimated 350 million people cross the Mexico-U.S. border (the equivalent of one million people a day); about 90 percent of bilateral trade, almost U.S.$300 billion, flows across the border; and every year approximately 70 million private vehicles and 4.5 million trucks cross the border (Mexican Embassy in the United States, 2005).

In addition, there is the phenomenon of undocumented immigration of Mexican workers. The most recent estimates calculate that each year approximately 380,000 Mexicans, half of whom have no documents, travel to the United States, either to stay permanently or temporarily. All this confirms the fact that this is the border with the most crossings in the world (Creel, 2004). According to the most recent estimates, these undocumented immigrants send their families in Mexico approximately U.S.$15 billion a year, a sum that constitutes the country’s second source of foreign currency, exceeding non-oil exports and foreign direct investment.

Throughout the twentieth century, border relations between the United States and Canada have been characterized by cooperation, which has increased since NAFTA came into effect. The Canadian government has promoted a considerable number of initiatives in matters of border relations with the U.S., among which is the 1995 Agreement between Canada and the United States on Our Shared Border. In this initiative, both countries committed themselves to work together to achieve the protection against illegal and irregular border activities, to facilitate the transit of goods and persons and to promote international trade. Other measures include the 1997 Border Vision initiative and the 1999 United States-Canada Association, through which both governments created a binational mechanism to study common border problems to harmonize policies and actions with respect to the border and increase efficiency in crossings of persons and merchandise and in environmental protection. In addition, corporate, trade and company associations will form a regional business coalition named “Americans for Better Borders” (Jiménez, Gabriel and Macdonald, 2003).

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Canadian government questioned its ability to face a similar situation, recognizing the need for greater cooperation with its southern neighbor, not only for safe, proper functioning at the border, but for establishing concrete actions against any possible terrorist act. Just like in the Mexican case, the closing of the border and the exhaustive security measures implemented afterward by the United States had a great economic impact, due to the fact that border crossings were delayed up to 18 hours. Consequently, more than 50 companies from various sectors formed the Coalition for Safe and Efficient Borders in Trade, declaring at the same time full support for the Canadian government to go ahead with the necessary coordination and cooperation measures with the United States to guarantee border security (Beatty, 2002).
In the case of Mexico, the 1991 establishment of the Border Linking Mechanism did not imply the development of a long-term vision about border management between both countries. Designing border measures as answers to immediate problems and the limited scope of the mechanisms have been constants. In fact, the transborder initiatives or cooperation policies between Mexico and the United States have traditionally been conceived as part of the international policies of border states, which have been developing informally for several years. An example of this is the relationship between Tijuana, Baja California and San Isidro, California, where their authorities have established ample cooperative actions that range from operations to prevent sailors from returning drunk to the United States, to contingency plans to prevent possible attacks with chemical or biological weapons (Ramos, 2001).

The encouragement for creating common border security stemmed from the necessities and guidelines marked by U.S. hegemony after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Before its North American partners, the United States has accepted the impossibility of unilaterally facing threats to the security of its territory, and has decided to encourage cooperation and concretizing agreements in the matter.

From the Bush administration’s perspective, security on the border “must be guided by the principles of co-responsibility, respect to sovereignty, compliance with constitutional restrictions and protection of human rights and of private life” (Ridge, 2004: 20). For his government, the fact that land borders have the type of infrastructure and administration systems that facilitate and guarantee the sustained integration of the economic region in North America has become “a vital necessity” (Office of International Information Programs, 2003a).

According to Tom Ridge, “in the future the border will be protected through international cooperation to increase the participation of intelligence information and face more efficiently the threats presented by terrorism, organized crime, the illegal traffic of immigrants and narcotics, pests and agricultural diseases, as well as the destruction of natural resources” (Ridge, 2004: 19). Consequently, in 2003, approximately U.S.$11 billion were assigned to increase border security, U.S.$2.2 billion more than in 2002. By 2005, the budget assignation for border security increased 5 percent, or U.S.$450 million extra. As a result, the resources earmarked for border security have increased by U.S.$9 billion since 9/11 (The White House, 2004 and 2005).

The construction of the so-called smart borders was North America’s most complete immediate institutional response to the threats to its security. By standardizing control procedures, smart borders can contain common threats, with which both public security and economic security will be mutually reinforced.
The smart borders initiative is developed through five principles: reinvent the border; extend economic efficiency; build security resources; share continental and global security; and develop twenty-first-century institutions.

The agreement to create a smart border with Mexico was signed March 21, 2002. Unlike the agreement with Canada (which includes 30 specific actions under four general headings: (a) ensure the transit of persons; (b) ensure the transit of goods; (c) develop safe infrastructure; and (d) coordinate and exchange information to reach these objectives), the action plan for the border between Mexico and the United States only includes 22 actions under three general headings: (a) ensure the transit of persons; (b) ensure the transit of goods; and (c) develop safe infrastructure.

For Canada, actions aimed at the creation of the smart border appear to strengthen the cooperation that already existed with its southern neighbor in this matter. Nevertheless, former Prime Minister Chrétien discarded the idea of a security perimeter, arguing that its creation “requires a degree of harmonization of policies, particularly in the area of migration, and the refugees who might infringe Canadian sovereignty” (Jiménez, Gabriel and Macdonald, 2003). Undoubtedly, cooperation between the United States and Canada on border security will be in the forefront, as is shown by the series of pilot projects implemented by Canada to examine Weigh-In-Motion technology at border crossings with the United States, that uses cutting-edge technology to gather, analyze and exchange data about traffic flows without hindering border trade (SPP, 2005).

With regard to port security, beginning in April 2005, the United States and Canada began implementing the Nexus-Marine Pilot Program at the Windsor-Detroit crossing to deal with the seasonal flow of small vessels. In this context of increased cooperation, from May 9 to 11, 2005, both countries carried out three exercises in port security in order to increase joint response capabilities in the case of a possible terrorist attack, particularly in the Great Lakes region (SPP, 2005).

The smart border between Mexico and the United States is on its way to becoming a reality. To date, a Bilateral Coordinating Committee has been established, an orientation framework has been agreed on for the protection of infrastructure and sectoral working groups on energy, telecommunications, transportation, dams, public health and agriculture have been set up. Mexico’s General Administration of Customs and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection created three specialized working groups (on borders, law enforcement and technology and customs procedures), which meet every three months and whose main purpose is to improve the application of Indicator Technology of the Situation of Visitors and Immigrants to the United States (U.S. Visit) program for the control of entries and exits from the United States as of December 31, 2003.
To guarantee the transit of goods along the U.S.-Mexican border the Fast and Safe Trade (Fast) program,27 designed by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was extended to the El Paso border between Mexico and the United States as of December 4, 2003.

Finally, with regard to the protection of North American air space, in addition to the discussions opened by the establishment of the Northern Command (Northcom), in 2004, the United States, Mexico and Canada committed themselves to creating a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which, based on the Global Positioning System, will favor operational security in aviation.28 In this context, by 2007, authorities hope to design a plan to improve security and efficiency in air navigation in North America (SPP, 2005).

The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) and the NAFTA Security Perimeter

Although the smart borders strategy was the first step in the creation of the security community in North America, it must be pointed out that these are bilateral agreements, centered on the legal flows of merchandise and persons, and their main objective is to standardize procedures and promote the security of both U.S. land borders. This explains the importance of the agreements reached at the Waco Summit and of the recommendations by the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, both oriented toward the creation of a North American security perimeter that transcends the idea of smart borders, and the definitive push for the process of construction of the security community.

At the March 2005 Waco summit, the three countries’ heads of state signed the SPP, a deepening of smart border accords and a decided boost to the construction of the North American security community. Based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary, the North American

27 As of September 2002, the Fast lanes operate at five points of entry on the border between the United States and Canada: Detroit and Port Huron, Michigan; Buffalo and Champlain, New York; and Blaine, Washington. To be eligible for the Fast lane, manufacturers, importers and transportation companies must participate in another program of the CBP against terrorism, the Customs-Trade Association against Terrorism (C-TPAT), according to which companies develop and implement security plans to improve security operations. Truck drivers must submit information that will enable CBP officers to evaluate if the applicant represents any danger. The approved applicants receive a Fast Commercial Driver Identification Card. The Fast has additional security characteristics on the U.S.-Mexico border. Manufacturers and transportation company drivers who participate in the Fast between the United States and Mexico are required to use high security mechanical seals on all of the containers or trailers going to the United States. Customs and Border Protection shall continue examining these deliveries with X-rays, dogs and other equipment to guarantee the integrity of the Fast program. The CBP also expects the additional security to improve their continuous efforts to intercept drugs along the border.

28 In June 2005, authorities predicted setting up 5 WAAS stations in Mexico and Canada before the end of the summer.
leaders committed to work to develop a common approach to security. The SPP includes the creation of a security perimeter to combat internal and external threats to security. This will also enable the implementation of a common model of response to emergencies that will guarantee the protection of the region’s infrastructure and ensure efficiency in moving goods and persons.

The SPP security agenda is divided into three main parts:

(a) Securing North America against external threats. This implies the development and implementation of analogous processes for inspecting travelers and cargo before their exit from a foreign port and in the first port of entry into North America. The strategies for achieving this include, among other things, the development of biometric standards, strengthening document security, exchange of information in real time and the establishment of compatible inspection standards.

(b) Preventing and responding to threats within North America. This means defining equivalent focuses to strengthen security in air, maritime and land transportation; fighting common threats (terrorism, organized crime, arms trafficking and migrant smuggling), that includes the response to cross-border terrorist incidents and natural disasters; increasing cooperation in intelligence matters and developing a common method for protecting infrastructure. Because of the importance of public border security between Mexico and the United States, the need to deepen cooperation between both countries in matters of the administration of justice on the border, prosecuting traffickers’ organizations in order to reduce violence, is vital.

(c) Streamlining the secure movement of low-risk traffic through our shared borders. The aim is to deepen the smart border agreements in order to make infrastructure more efficient and so improve the legal flow of persons and goods in the region (SPP, 2005).

The idea of the North American security perimeter is also present in the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America’s chairmen’s statement, released before the Waco meeting. According to the Independent Task Force, it is necessary to create an Action Plan for the North American Borders, through further agreements on the smart borders, and to include elements such as the joint inspection of container vehicles entering North American ports, the creation of a common approach in the international negotiations related to global movement of people, cargo and vessels, as well as the harmonization of: (a) visa and asylum policies; (b) the procedures of identification and tracking of persons, goods and vehicles (iden-
ified by biometric characteristics); and (c) tracking procedures and monitoring of exits and of imports and exports; as well as the sharing of transit information (Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, 2005).

The proposal also points out the importance of extending cooperation to the area of law enforcement and to matters related to defense. However, at least in the short term, trilateral agreements are not likely to be signed in these matters, given Canada’s ambiguous position on the subject and, above all, due to the impossibility of Mexico’s accepting participation in measures such as the creation of a trinational intelligence center on threats, joint training of police forces or participation in a trinational defense force. As an example, we have Mexico and Canada’s reactions to the establishment of a Northcom within the framework of restructuring North American security and defense policies.

In Mexico, the executive, Congress and the army itself refused any Mexican participation in Northcom. For the Mexican military, this is normal procedure and does not involve the country’s military sovereignty (Vallarta, 2002; Davidow, 2002). Given tradition in the matter of foreign policy and internal conditions, it is clear that, for the time being, Mexico will not risk participating in any security system involving direct armed forces participation. Military and security collaboration with the United States will continue to happen in the fight against drug trafficking and cooperation, but it will not mean, at least in the short term, greater participation in international missions, which would be limited to humanitarian assistance in case of disasters and to nearby areas (Moloeznik, 2001).

Therefore, today, the armed forces continue their struggle against drug trafficking and organized crime, terrorism and illegal trafficking in arms and persons, besides helping to solve “the insufficiencies in the poorest areas of our country, where support is needed in social, educational and health areas” (National Development Plan, Mexico 2000).

But Canada’s reaction was ambiguous. In principle, Canada defined the command as an internal U.S. policy; however, the government announced it would begin a series of consultations with its southern neighbor in this matter. The North

29 For decades, the Mexican armed forces have systematically helped countries affected by hurricanes, earthquakes, storms and forest fires. Mexico’s Senate has authorized the military to leave the country for humanitarian missions. Solidarity work beyond Mexico’s borders has been clear in recent years in the support given to several Latin American countries: “In 1996, help was given to Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Cuba, struck by hurricanes, and to Ecuador after an earthquake. In 1998, support was given to Bolivia when it was hit by an earthquake and to the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador due to hurricanes; in 1999, help was given to Colombia because of an earthquake and to Venezuela due to intense rain; and to the Republic of Guatemala, from April 28 to May 4, 2001, to put out forest fires on ecological reserves in the Department of Petén. In addition to that, the Ministry of the Navy helped Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in 1998 after the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch”. See Moloeznik 2001: 108.
American Air Space Defense Command (Norad) has served as a framework for surveillance of air routes in the United States and Canada through the Noble Eagle Operation, which keeps armed airplanes alert for irregular patrolling to identify and intercept suspect flights.\(^{30}\) However, at the same time, as has already been mentioned, Chrétien discarded the idea of a security perimeter, arguing that its creation “requires a degree of harmonization of policies, especially in the area of immigration and refugees, which might infringe on Canadian sovereignty.”

Finally, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin denied any participation of Canada in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program, thus putting an end to two years of internal discussions on the issue. However, he confirmed Canada’s commitment to promoting regional cooperation in security matters, by strengthening borders, reinforcing sovereignty in the Arctic and Canada’s participation in Norad.

Undocumented Immigration and Drug Trafficking on the Mexico-United States Agenda: The Ghost of Unilateralism

We must also take into consideration the fact that smart border agreements are intended to guarantee the legal transit of persons and goods, as well as the development of the adequate infrastructure along both U.S. borders. Consequently, although it is an important step for the creation of a security perimeter in North America, the great pending task will continue to be dealing with the issue of the immigration of Mexican workers (“illegal” for United States, “undocumented” for Mexico) in which the tendency is that unilateral U.S. actions on cooperation and understanding will prevail.

Without a doubt, the United States and Mexico will have to design an ambitious border agenda, which must include migrants, smugglers of people (“polleros”), smugglers of goods, organized crime, water supply and environmental protection. After the events of September 11, 2001 most analysts were optimistic in considering that, in exchange for an immigration agreement, Mexico could be totally cooperative in seeking effective border security (Bailey, 2002).

However, despite the fact that the United States considers illegal migration one of the threats to its security, the struggle against terrorism and practical actions concerning border security subordinated a possible immigration agreement with Mexico.

\(^{30}\) Between September 2001 and March 2003 there were 27,000 flights to dissuade, prevent and defend themselves against potential terrorist attacks besides consolidating interagency cooperation and carrying out the Plan of North America air surveillance, meaning a greater coordination of the North American Air Force-Surveillance Council. Also, an agreement to establish a Binational Planning Group for two years was signed. In this framework Norad has conducted a series of exercise training flights in coordination with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration throughout the United States and Canada. See Eberhart, 2003.
On the contrary, Tom Ridge has publicly stated that “undocumented aliens are as dangerous to the United States as terrorists, drug dealers or weapons of mass destruction” (Nájar, 2004).

The latent concern regarding the possibility that Islamic terrorists may enter the United States from Mexico became stronger in August 2004 after the arrest of Farida Goolam Mohamed Ahmed. According to more recent data, between September 1, 2003 and August 2, 2004, the Border Patrol arrested 57,633 non-Mexican immigrants and, since 9/11, has arrested 700 immigrants related to terrorist groups.

U.S. attention is still focused on the porosity of the border and, independently of the Agreement on Smart Borders, it is unilaterally promoting its own border security agenda by strengthening border controls, which may even lead to the exclusion or marginalization of its North American partners’ interests. That is the reason for the importance that Mexico and Canada place on the reinforcement of the dialogue and cooperation with the United States.31

For Mexican authorities, the way to face the challenge of illegal immigration between both countries lies in a guest workers’ agreement. However, in the short term, the possibility of signing an agreement of this kind seems remote, while actions against immigrants to strengthen U.S. safety measures will continue to increase.

On the other hand, drug trafficking, and especially the wave of violence that has broken out in the last few weeks in Mexican border states, is the other difficult issue in the Mexico-U.S. relationship. Drug trafficking, on the bilateral agenda since the 1980s, seems to be reaching a point that requires the renewal of cooperative efforts by both countries to combat it.

31 There are numerous examples of strengthening of border controls and of antimigrant actions, such as:

• Greater control along the border with Mexico, the clearest example of which is the Arizona Border Control (ABC), an operation that aims to strengthen border surveillance, with a budget of half a million dollars per week. The project includes the use of Predator-type spy planes, an increase of 400 Border Patrol agents, the establishment of a special camp on the Tohono Indian reservation to concentrate undocumented migrants and a voluntary repatriation program.

• The strengthening of controls on the Mexican border includes Border Patrol use of rubber bullets and mustard gas against the migrants, apparently agreed within the framework of the 2001 Action Plan for Border Security, which has recently been the subject of numerous debates within Mexico.

• The announcement made by former Attorney General Ashcroft concerning the possibility of detaining any undocumented migrant “for security reasons” indefinitely.

• The control and even non-recognition of the Mexican consular registry, an identification document that over 1,200,000 Mexicans in the United States have.

• The unilateral deportation of undocumented workers detained in Arizona (even chaining their hands and feet) within the framework of the Lateral Repatriation Program and staging raids in areas where a large number of undocumented aliens live, such as California.

• House of Representatives passage of the Real ID Act, which argues security reasons to limit political asylum; modifies a series of uses of the Consular Registration (such as making it insufficient for applying for a driver’s license and requiring proof of legal residency); authorizes the construction of a 5.5 km extension of the San Diego security wall (making it a total of 22.4 km long); and requires that the Department of Homeland Security develop and implement a pilot program to identify and test land surveillance technologies in Tucson, Arizona.
As I have mentioned before, Mexico’s internal stability is a security issue for our northern neighbor. Consequently, the United States government has made public announcements regarding the violence generated by drug traffickers, in order to “protect” its citizens who travel to Mexico.

Thus, on January 26, the State Department issued an announcement alerting its citizens to the insecurity along the border with Mexico. Later, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico sent a letter pointing to the increase in violence in the border cities and Mexican authorities’ inability to stop it.

In view of U.S. announcements and the possibility of having Mexico return to the list of countries which the United States submits to the process of “anti-drug certification,” the Mexican government has responded by adhering to its foreign policy tradition, demanding from its North American partner respect and non-intervention in the internal matters of the country. However, if this reaction from the Mexican government is not accompanied by a negotiating strategy, it is very likely that the cooperation between both countries will be subordinated and threatened by U.S. unilateralism.

Unfortunately, the disagreements between both governments seem to be prevailing over encouragement for new cooperative actions. Mexico should benefit from U.S. concern about the security along its northern border and the country’s general stability by proposing new cooperation programs. President Fox’s government has the possibility of opening negotiations with our northern neighbor, resulting in the contribution of resources and technology, not only to combat drug trafficking, but also to shore up attention to other priority issues for our country, like social exclusion and unemployment, which tend to foster insecurity.

Is a Security Community Possible in North America after New Orleans?
While, as was pointed out above, the SPP document mentioned developing common strategies for dealing with natural disasters, it is true that the development of the security community in North America was marked by U.S. concerns about guaranteeing the security of its territory: terrorism, drug trafficking and migration were

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32 According to the State Department, 27 United States citizens have been kidnapped, two were murdered and 11 are still missing.

33 Among other things, Ambassador Garza said that, “Although violence in border cities is not new, the fight among groups of drug traffickers is increasing and has resulted in drastic increases of murder and kidnapping, posing a threat to the integrity of U.S. citizens.” He also expressed his concern regarding “the local police forces’ inability to combat the drug lords. Kidnapping and violence in general will have a negative effect on tourism and trade along our borders, which are both vital for the region’s prosperity.” And he denounced impunity, saying, “The criminals have an impressive arsenal of weapons, since they know that it is not very likely that they will be caught and punished.”
the central points on which the three countries’ dialogue centered. However, the recent natural disasters caused by hurricanes Katrina in New Orleans and Stan and Wilma in southeastern Mexico may launch a new stage in the construction of the North American security community. This because they showed that governments were hard put to deal with this kind of threat to their security and fulfill their basic function: ensuring the safety of their populations.

In the case of the United States, the security paradigm centered on the fight against terrorism and the deployment of military capabilities abroad (like the war in Iraq) has demonstrated its limits given the failed response to the disaster, which also uncovered the great economic and social inequalities in the most powerful country on Earth.

Both Mexican troops sent to lend aid in the Katrina emergency,34 and the support offered by the U.S. government to deal with the devastation caused by Stan and Wilma35 are important steps in the construction of a security community because they reinforce solidarity and foster trust between the two countries.

The increase in interdependence and mutual responsibility, pointed to by Deutsch as fundamental for the development of the security community, is underway in North America. Mexican troops’ being sent to the United States implies this recognition of mutual responsibility in matters of security and Mexico’s clear belonging to the region of North America. The Mexican government’s reaction, while based on the need to support the Mexican population in the disaster area, sent a clear signal of political will to the United States for advancing in the construction of the security community.

It is true that the debate about Mexico’s participation in a possible regional security system continues. General Vega has rejected any possibility of participating in the Northern Command or in the UN peacekeeping missions arguing the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Aranda and Becerril, 2005). Nevertheless, we must remember that joint operations of the armed forces are a higher stage of the construction of a pluralist security community that implies the development of a common identity in matters of security, the perception of security as a common good, as well as the creation of institutions and mechanisms for cooperation and understanding around this issue.

Based on the possible U.S. recognition of the “other” threats to its security and the appropriate reaction of the Mexican government, our country has a new win-

34 Mexico’s humanitarian aid operation began September 7, 2005 when 300 troops and 45 military vehicles were sent to aid Katrina victims in San Antonio.
35 According to the U.S. embassy in Mexico, the total amount of its aid to Mexico for the two natural disasters came to U.S.$600 000.
dow of opportunity for furthering the negotiation of priority issues for the integration of North America like the creation of a social fund, immigration and the general framework of regional security that must necessarily reconsider the risks and threats to it.

If September 11, 2001 was a turning point in the conception of international security, situating terrorism as the main threat against it, the recent natural disasters that include hurricanes, typhoons, droughts, tsunamis and earthquakes around the globe may spark a new moment in the conception of security on all levels. The superpower is ethnocentric and only recognizes threats and weaknesses when it suffers from them directly. This happened with terrorism, which for years was not considered the main issue in international security. It is to be hoped that it will now happen with natural disasters, and that the United States will not waste this new opportunity to become the leader of a world crusade not only against terrorism, but against all the real threats to human security: poverty, social exclusion, pandemics and natural disasters, which create vulnerability worldwide.

CONCLUSIONS

With their respective differences, both North America and the European Union are immersed in building security communities, triggered by the events of September 11, 2001, and March 2004, two turning points in the processes of integration: the explicit recognition by the members of each of the blocs that the new security threats demand not only reinforced cooperation to face them, but also the creation of common identities in security matters. At the end of the day, even though the construction of an identity is debatable, the building of a community is unavoidable.

In general, both of these security integration processes could be outlined in the way described in the table on page 134.

The European Union of the 25 is clearly on its way toward the consolidation of a supranational security community, the result of its own integration process, in which the search for mechanisms to guarantee mutual security and face third parties was always a concern. Although it has had its ups and downs, the European Union has proven its capacity to come out of its crises greatly strengthened: each disagreement of the members, which on occasions seemed to lead to splits beyond repair, ends by becoming the driving force for new agreements and for the consolidation of the integration project.

One of the consequences of the 11-M, 7-J and 21-J attacks is that they finished closing the gap between the United States and what Rumsfeld coined as “old Europe,”
### Table 1
SECURITY INTEGRATION PARAMETERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>North America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of security community</td>
<td>• Tightly coupled pluralistic security community (tending toward an amalgamated security community)</td>
<td>• Loosely coupled pluralistic security community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage of evolution</td>
<td>• Ascendant (moving toward consolidation)</td>
<td>• Nascent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>• Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)</td>
<td>• Mechanisms of consultation and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)</td>
<td>• Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political and Security Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• European Military Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• European Military Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security concept</td>
<td>• Multidimensional</td>
<td>• Trilateral concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, security in borders, immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border controls and immigration</td>
<td>• European Agency for the Management of External Borders</td>
<td>• Smart Borders Agreements (bilateral: U.S.-Mex/U.S.-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• United States and Canada Forum on Trans-Border Crime (USA-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Border Vision (USA-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Working Group on Security and Border Cooperation in the framework of Binational Commission (Mex-USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against terrorism</td>
<td>• European Strategic Plan against Terrorism</td>
<td>• Cooperation (borders, airports and information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bilateral Consultant Group on Cooperation against Terrorism (U.S.-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Terrorist Interception Program (TIP) (U.S.-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and armed forces (cooperation and coordination)</td>
<td>• Europol, Eurocorps</td>
<td>• Norad (U.S.-Can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ESDP Missions</td>
<td>• Northcom (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• European Defense Agency</td>
<td>• Mexico does not participate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
represented by France and Germany, opened with the fight against terrorism and the war in Iraq. Like it or not, the concern about safety was the principal basis of the accords with a view to the approval of the European Constitution, and it will also be the motivation for strengthening the two pillars of the union that until now have been considered fragile, given its dependence on its members’ willingness to cooperate: the CFPS and judicial cooperation. Europe is clearly securitizing its agenda.

The global role of the EU in the next few years (just like that of the United States) will be defined by the deployment of all its physical and strategic resources to guarantee the defense of its internal space –equivalent to the U.S.’s homeland security. For this reason, the risks of a deepening of the securitization of the agendas continue to exist and the danger of subordinating the other components of a multidimensional vision of European security is very feasible.

Just like the in United States, in Europe, the entire legal-political framework for defending European territory will undoubtedly prejudice individual liberties, the pride of the Western democracies. Therefore, we are entering into a period of review not only of European countries’ national security policies, but of a wholesale revision of the multicultural, inclusionary model of society they felt so proud of.

The theoretical and analytical repercussions of the way that international violence has changed, personified in the supposed Islamic extremism, for the time being has the paradigm of social coexistence that amalgamates all Europeans in check. Their values and principles, the pride of their civilization, are under review and it is no mere chance that the last call of the Spanish government has been for an alliance among civilizations, counterposed to the clash of civilizations.

In the case of NAFTA, the conformation of North America on the basis of security matters is increasing and the framework for a trilateral convergence is there. Although it is in its initial stage, the recognition of the North American security community shifts the problem to the definition, conformation and implementation of these policies, putting them in their correct context. Beyond an identity, a community is in the making.

Reality is proving that national interests and threats go beyond our borders, thus expanding the effects of national security to the space of regional security. The projection of a regional North American bloc in international politics is far from being a fact. However, what is happening is that a regional bloc is coming into being with political progress in the coordination and articulation of actions, although under U.S. hegemony.

The security community, in the sense of a common identity and an automatic identification of common threats in relations among the North American countries, is far from being explicit. In addition to the historic heritage, Mexico is trapped in a definition of foreign policy and security; there are differences inherent to the asymmetry
among the countries, which for economic reasons, such as migration and work, foster various opposing forms of nationalism that show the divergence of national interests.

Cooperation of all kinds will deepen among the three nations of North America. And, once more, Canada will continue to be ahead in deepening cooperation in military matters. In the meantime, Mexico will try to safeguard U.S. security by stepping up its efforts to organize smart borders to make sure that it honors its interest in supporting its neighbor, as well as by maintaining internal stability and a minimum agreement among the country’s political forces. Currently, however, disagreements tend to prevail over agreements. Nevertheless, one of the highlights of Mexico-U.S. relations is that Mexico’s economic, political and social stability is a priority for the United States, a situation which, besides requiring increased cooperation on border security matters, opens an important window of opportunity for negotiations with the Mexican government, including the issues of the multidimensional security agenda such as the fight against poverty, diseases and the environmental deterioration.

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