Elections, Political Integration, and North America: Exploring the Unknown

IMTIAZ HUSSAIN*

ABSTRACT

Given unwieldy cross-border electoral spillovers, how feasible is North American political integration? Even by largely satisfying neofunctionalist and security community theoretical tenets, this study finds North American political integration ultimately depends on: (a) a bipartisan orientation shift; (b) institutionalizing this shift; (c) the relative weight of integrative and disintegrative instincts; (d) safeguards against external shocks; (e) creating new opportunities of cooperation; and (f) leadership compatibility. Among other findings: (a) U.S. elections impact Canada and Mexico more than vice versa; (b) insufficient Canadian-Mexican economic flows deepen asymmetry towards the United States; (c) both ideology and pragmatic leadership fuel North Americanization; and (d) post-Cold War issues actually increase Mexico’s Washington influence at Canada’s expense. By favoring interdependence over integration, asymmetry ultimately becomes the straw that will break the North American camel’s back.

Key words: North Americanization; functionalism/neofunctionalism; security community; regional political/economic integration; socioeconomic electoral criteria; electoral externalities; multiculturalism; evangelism.

QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH

Is electing the chief executive in Canada, Mexico, or the United States impacting the North American region? After 12 years of the North American Free Trade Agreement

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(NAFTA), can political integration build upon economic integration? Does North Americanization reflect integration, interdependence, or simply convergence? How do all of the above relate to embedded North American asymmetry?

Four sections in this article address these questions. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of comparative concepts and analytical dimension, I apply these to an examination of electing chief executives, singling out the 2004 U.S. election for extra attention. Drawing conclusions and projecting future implications complete the study.

THEORETICAL MERRY-GO-ROUND

Two theoretical contexts prove useful: political development, which provides comparative electoral components, and the economic and political integration inter-relationship, which seeks lessons from West European experiences.

Comparative Electoral Components

Elections are all about politics; and at least within the domestic context, politics are all about elections: which party wins, what policies to adopt, how to distribute rewards and costs, and who to hold responsible from the essential considerations in both politics and elections. Both beasts change slightly when examined across countries. Gabriel Almond’s “political culture” provided the original comparative yardstick (1957: 396), but was subsequently disaggregated, modified, or refined, either as policy catalysts or responses, into other types of culture, related processes and institutions, unavoidable crises and sequences, and issue orientations.

From a study of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations, Almond and Sidney Verba decomposed civic culture into parochial, subject, and participant types (1963: ch. 1), to which Lucian Pye added rationalization at a level beyond the state (1965: ch. 1). Salient among their end products was an upwardly mobile country-specific group, and how this group rallies across national boundaries is becoming a standard topic of investigation. Leonard Binder and others in the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) alerted us to crises and sequences in what they called the development syndrome. Distinguishing between differentiation, equality, and capacity in the evolving political system, they exposed identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution as comparable categories, and thereby the crisis potential of each and a possible sequence among them (Binder, Coleman, La Palombara et al., 1971).
All was not as well and good as theory predicted. At least three weaknesses were retrospectively discerned. First, specific policies were neglected, and dramatically exposed by the 1970s oil price hikes. Second, adopting an etic approach at the expense of the emic virtually ignored idiosyncrasies in favor of epistemic interpretations (Avruch, 1998: 60-72), thus breeding the inappropriate one-size-fits-all analytical tendency. Finally, viewing countries as being either developed or not on the analytical drawing board produced an undesirable Manichean twist whereby shades of gray, that is, different developmental experiences, could not be meaningfully explained.

Specifying policy issues produced mixed results. Since each issue is assigned a different priority by different countries, any selection automatically carried an inherent bias, yet, the more dynamics captured by the analytical frameworks, the more robust the analysis and interpretations. The need to step beyond the state increased as the number of issues vying for attention increased. Accommodating similar and different country responses to positions on the state of the economy, immigration, the environment, and other policy areas inspired innovative interpretations (Ashford, 1981; 1982; Conradt, 1986; Graham and Farkas et al., 1994; Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Katzenstein, 1987; Safran, 1991), and expanded our knowledge of presidential-parliamentary governments, pluralist-corporatist influences, and ideological-pragmatic orientations.

Exogeneity and endogeneity became relevant terms (Lane and Errson, 2003: 12-13), the former alluding to externalizing domestic policy preferences, and the latter to internalizing policy preferences from other countries. The economy, ethnicity, religion, political institutions, democratic consolidation, and other spillovers exemplify of both. Immanuel Kant’s three definitive articles on liberalism were revived when the Cold War ended, informing us on the emergence of constitutional law, whether it was translating into international law, and what the prospects of cosmopolitan law were (Doyle, 1986: 1150-69). Because liberalism is interpreted differently depending, for instance, on how much one benefits from it, we find out why exploitation is a popular less-developed-country (LDC) interpretation, while an escalator of progress provides the corresponding developed country (DC) metaphor.

Mexico’s North American positioning illustrates many of these points. Its shift from what Peruvian poet Mario Vargas Llosa called the “perfect dictatorship” in the early 1990s to what Freedom House labeled a “free” country in 2004 (Puddington and Piano, 2005: 103-08), ended the sexenio cycle (Edwards and Naím, 1997): between 1976 and 1994, mismanagement, misappropriations, and myopic policymaking, produced economic crisis by the last year of every president’s 6-year term; yet large-scale borrowings from Washington catalyzed liberalization and democratization. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León’s breaking the dedazo tradition of
not appointing his successor in 2000 led to his party, the PRI, being defeated for the first time in 70 years, but filled the missing democratization blank of governmental rotation and produced a free trade agreement with the European Union, which preconditions it on democratic performance. On the other hand, Devesh Kapur and Moisés Naím express concern that the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) “widening agenda” in “achieving capitalist ‘development’” only breeds “grave pause to anyone who cares about the plight of democracy in borrower countries” (2005: 89-99).

Various dimensions of ideology also begged attention. Because ideology was “present in many democratic party systems,” Arend Lijphart spelled out seven comparative dimensions (1981: 26-27): socioeconomic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post-materialism. Table 1 extracts his observations for Canada and U.S. in the first seven rows, while parenthesizing twenty-first century adjustments for both and adding Mexico. The last row specifies various traits of candidate selection in the three countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-ethnic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime support</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>(x)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Traits**

- Incumbency, above-average socioeconomic status and education, local connections but state-wide appeal
- Above average socioeconomic status and education; Mexico City connections but state-wide appeal
- Incumbency, above average socioeconomic status and education; local connections but state-wide appeal

**Sources:** Lijphart, 1981: 31; Ranney, 1981: 75-106.

In the first row, the socioeconomic dimension addresses at least four issues: (a) public versus private ownership; (b) governmental intervention or restraint in the economy; (c) wealth distribution; and (d) social welfare provisions by the government. Although Lijphart found left-right ideological differences to be moderate in Canada and the United States during the 1970s, compared to West European countries, the
socioeconomic dimension still stood out as the most significant of them all. In the absence of an ideological flavor, unbridled post-Cold War liberalization may also widen those differences between both countries. Mexico’s socioeconomic impetus, which also lacks this ideological bent, is nevertheless stronger because it constantly confronts pressures from embedded economic polarization, social stratification, and continued political patronage. The absence of ideological influence does not mean the end of ideology, but its conversion into a political instrument utilized subjectively.

Lijphart did not find religion important in either Canada or the United States in the 1970s, but evangelism is emerging as a dominant U.S. political force today. Since it is premised upon converting non-believers, especially in other countries, it is becoming a potentially formidable foreign policy instrument directed at indigenous populations, as in Mexico’s South. Even though Mexico’s Catholicism also benefited from the president’s PAN party being more closely connected with the church than the PRI ever was, the soft, subtle evangelical challenge it faces today could become destabilizing and serve as a preview of Latin America (Samuel Shah, 2004: 117-31).

Related to the religion dimension is the cultural-ethnic counterpart, a cleavage Lipset and Stein Rokkan brought to the analytical forefront to account for the homogeneous-heterogeneous country dichotomy (1964: 1-64). As the world’s first institutionally multi-culturalized country, and with the Anglo-Saxon versus French divide being older than the country itself, Canada alone reflected this dimension in the 1970s. While it continues to do so even today, albeit on a diminishing post-NAFTA note, the United States, at least from Samuel P. Huntington’s viewpoint, is exhibiting a dramatic transformation along these lines with Hispanics not only displacing Afro-Americans as the largest minority since 2003 but also challenging the Anglo-Saxon U.S. core, much to Huntington’s dismay (2004: 30-45). Electoral patterns cannot escape these socioeconomic dynamics. The U.S. Hispanic vote, for example, still remains largely Democrat, but the increasing shift toward the Republican Party may deprive Democrats from precisely the critical votes they need to prevail in close elections (Chávez-Márquez, 2005: 98). This is new, and if it makes Hispanics a critical U.S. voting bloc, the huge North American consequences cannot be ignored. Similarly for Mexico, just as economic liberalization provoked the 13 percent of its inhabitants known as indigenous by privatizing ejidos, democratic elections are likely to become more unpredictable and divisive because of this and other similar emergent cleavages.

Another Lipset-Rokkan cleavage, certainly for Mexico, but not insignificant for the U.S. as the 2004 presidential elections indicated, is urban-rural. Although not a factor, Lijphart found relevant during the 1970s in either Canada or the United
States, it may be of ascending twenty-first century importance in both Mexico and the U.S. This cleavage overlaps the cultural-ethnic cleavage discussed earlier, accentuated also by NAFTA-triggered farm liberalization sowing seeds of discord across the countryside. How this plays out in Mexico’s 2006 elections may better explain its long-term strength, especially when NAFTA is widening the north-south gap within Mexico. That it is not a passive force was evident in the 2004 U.S. elections: Republicans triumphed in critical Ohio, for instance, by mobilizing the conservative countryside with both an evangelical message and appeals to trust and character, replicated elsewhere across middle America by Karl Rove, Bush’s multi-purpose brain (Green, 2004: 96; and Tumulty, 2004-2005: 47).

Regime support measures the degree of opposition to existing democratic regimes, typically triggered from the far-left or far-right flanks of the political spectrum. It was not a factor in the 1970s, and remains unimportant in Canada and the United States even today. Nevertheless, how the 2000 U.S. elections produced a president who did not have the popular majority vote and why the 2004 elections show signs of another realignment suggest increasing erosion of regime support (Schafer, 1991: 63-64). Even within the dominant Republican Party, disdain for Washington politics based on interest-group influences may be producing a quite different democratic beast. Government intervention becomes a subsequently malleable issue to also spill over into the regime-support category, as with other issues invoking inter-branch U.S. politics. Whether the president is imperial (Neustadt, 1960), the judiciary neutral, or Congress representative are as debatable today in the United States as during the country’s foundation between 1776 and 1789 in Philadelphia.

Though not yet a salient force in Mexico, paralysis from a divided government may invite the kind of populism common in Latin American history, and with it, democratic erosion of sorts. Besides, Mexico’s transition from the PRI’s perfect dictatorship is far from complete, suggesting the hiatus still remaining between adopting and institutionalizing certain norms, on the one hand, and their full-fledged translation into real life, on the other. A previous reference to economic polarization, social stratification, and political patronage suggests it will be a long and thorny road.

Although foreign policy did not exert barometric socioeconomic pressures during the 1970s, it may emerge as a salient post-9/11 factor in the United States and become an increasing post-NAFTA Mexican consideration (Wolfe, 2004: 97-118). Certainly the war on terrorism gave the incumbent an edge during the 2004 elections, a factor Republicans have capitalized on as effectively as the Democrats have not, and whose future consequences for U.S. politics could be immense. Greater Mexican trade dependence on the United States also makes foreign policy increas-
ingly significant to its elections. How much more to liberalize and which public sector industry to deregulate next remain paramount Mexican concerns. Even the emigration of Mexican *maquiladoras* indicates how global production is challenging North American production at Mexico’s expense. Compounding all of these are the diversions of U.S. foreign policy interests from economic to security issues after 9/11, and the simultaneous U.S. priority shift from NAFTA to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and other free trade agreements (FTAs). Ironically, 9/11, NAFTA, and the FTAA also expose how Canada’s uncomfortable coexistence with the U.S. makes foreign policy salient. Otherwise Ross Perot’s infamous prediction of jobs being swallowed by a giant sucking sound in the south, also becomes true for Canada and the U.S.

Finally, post-materialism, evident in such policy areas as environmental protection, human rights considerations, and simple quality of life issues, is increasingly reflecting Canadian leadership. At the same time, given its antithetical relationship with unrestricted liberalism and materialism, it remains a poor Mexican and U.S. predictor. Ronald Inglehart coined the term to capture grassroots concerns (for example, greater policy-making participation by citizens [1977]), and although NAFTA’s side-bar agreements boosted local-level engagements in all three countries, post-material values have so far been subordinated to materialist pursuits, particularly in Mexico and the United States.

Polarizing these dichotomies is ideology, perhaps the bedrock interpretational prism of democracy as expressed by a political party. In his study of “the values, beliefs, and issue-positions” of U.S. parties between the 1830s and 1990s, John Gerring finds party views not only “coherent, differentiated, and stable,” but also “irreducibly ideological” (1998: 6). By lumping Whigs and Republicans into one category, he finds a historical ideological shift inside the party from nationalism between 1828 and 1924 toward neoliberalism from 1928. Likewise, Democrats shifted from Jeffersonianism during 1828 to 1892 to populism between 1896 and 1948, before embracing universalism thereafter. Whereas Republican attention shifted from the order-anarchy dichotomy to the state-individual counterpart, Democrats prioritized liberty-tyranny, people-interest groups, and inclusion-exclusion, in that order, during the three phases examined. Accordingly, and interestingly, the original Republican themes of Protestantism, moral reforms, mercantilism, free labor, social harmony, and statism were replaced by anti-statism, free market capitalism, right-wing populism, and individualism. With George W. Bush’s evangelism (Guth, 2004: ch. 6), a twenty-first century Republican admixture may be emerging. On the other hand, Democrats remain today at the other end of wherever they were originally, when white supremacy, anti-statism, and civic Republicanism domi-
nated. Replaced by egalitarianism, majoritarianism, and Christian humanism, their key characteristics became civil rights, social welfare, redistribution, and inclusion (Gerring, 1998: tables 1 and 2).


When the secret vote was first introduced in 1878, Canada’s Conservatives took charge politically and were to remain behind the steering wheel until 1896, when Canada’s “Liberal Century” began. Ironically, the ethno-religious cleavage also remained salient throughout that century, aligning with the Anglo-Saxon-French divide. While the Conservatives found natural support from Anglos and, interestingly, Quebecois francophones until 1896, Liberals increasingly attracted French support. Even as the Conservatives remained popular in the countryside, they did not quite connect philosophically with western farmers. Similarly, the Liberals could not abandon their urban roots and appeal to swing countryside voters sufficiently. Not surprisingly, Sir John A. Macdonald’s staunchly nationalistic policy orientation in the late nineteenth century was not embraced by farmers, and not until John Diefenbaker began embracing free trade after 1957 would the farmers flock to the Conservatives. Ironically, it was the Conservative proposal for free trade with the United States in 1985 that stuck, not the ill-fated 1911 Liberal proposal (Hillmer and Granatstein, 1994: 35-45). Nevertheless, not heeding the 1911 lesson of avoiding free trade agreements with the United States would come back to haunt Brian Mulroney, who made the 1985 proposal. In the 1988 election, he not only saw his huge margin of victory reduced to palpitating levels (Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crête, 1991: 315-339), but was in fact forced to resign shortly thereafter because free trade with the United States had become so unpopular. Canada and Mexico must calibrate foreign policy and domestic preferences shrewdly.

Mexico’s PRI probably proved to be the most coherent and stable, but undifferentiated, North American party by virtue of its long tenure at the helm. Although Mexico’s leftist party, the PRD, is more radical than Canada’s Liberals and the U.S. Democrats, it is seeking a more pragmatic policy positioning than in the past, especially under Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. His philosophical admixtures echo those of Democrat Bill Clinton in the United States and Liberal Paul Martin in Canada. On the other side of the spectrum, the PAN is the flag-bearer...
of moral issues in Mexico, aligns more with the Catholic church than any other major party, and appears as the ideological counterpart of the Canadian Conservatives and U.S. Republicans. If North America is to ever show the central tendencies within the European Parliament, where the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats serve as the ideological flanks (Raunio, 2001: 231-51), these political alignments may represent more a reality than wishful thinking. How these ideological identities adjust to the pragmatism of regionalist policy-making is a fascinating topic of investigation whose time is beckoning: already in the NAFTA-triggered integrative atmosphere, legislators from all three countries not only convene frequently but also issue joint statements on selected issues, a genesis not very different from the embryonic stages of the European Parliament during the 1960s and 1970s (Judge and Earnshaw, 2002).

Drawing North American identities and parallels such as these is still precarious. For example, although Canadian Liberals get along comfortably with U.S. Democrats, particularly when Chrétien and Clinton led their respective countries, strain is not unknown: Jimmy Carter and Trudeau, for example, had a rather cool relationship. Similarly, although the PAN’s Fox and Republican George W. Bush got their rancho politics off famously, highlighted by the 2001 White House celebration of Mexico’s Cinco de Mayo eviction of the French in the 1860s, PRI presidents like Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Zedillo were also popular in Washington, the former even nominated by the United States as the first director general of the World Trade Organization in 1994. Whether Conservatives-Republicans-PAN become North America’s Christian Democrats, as in the European Parliament, or Liberals-Democrats-PRI/PRD become Europe’s Social Democrats across North America or not, a regional-level ideological identity faces several constraints.

One is regional asymmetry favoring the U.S. This has the effect of compelling parties of different ideological feathers in Canada and Mexico to pay heed and, no matter how imperfectly or half-heartedly, to adjust to their powerful neighbor’s preferences. A second reason may be Mexico’s less-developed stature: since it is not quite in the same ranks as Canada and the United States, post-industrial issues have commanded, and are likely to continue commanding, only token attention, while the wide North American economic gap is likely to sustain a healthy anti-capitalist resistance as in the past, thus encouraging leftist parties and identities to tilt left even more than in Canada or the U.S. Finally, amidst Canadian divisions, economic imperatives to stay connected to the U.S. engine, and multilateral instincts extending regionalism beyond the U.S., are likely to be both uphill and peculiar. While the original division between Anglo-Saxons and French seems to be ebbing at the turn of the new century, NAFTA may actually be marginalizing Quebec more than one
may have expected, as the flight of businesses from the province suggests; and at
the same time a new east-west division gaining momentum seems to be transcending
not only the Anglo-Saxon versus French schism, but also attracting second gen-
eration Asian immigrants significantly to actually give the Liberalist-Conservative
divide a new face. How liberal status-preserving Chinese or Indians may become
remains as open a question as what degree of moral considerations may fragment
Conservatives.

Economically, as the 1985 MacDonald Report recommended, Canada has no
choice but to strengthen relations with the U.S., its largest partner, if it is to remain
viable, yet U.S. trade-boosting efforts in other parts of the world only subtract from
Canada: with diversified partners, the U.S. needs Canada less than vice versa. Even
Canadian multiculturalism is a source of the post-9/11 U.S. threat: northern U.S.
borders face greater surveillance than ever before. Finally, Canadian multilateral-
ism also undermines the country’s regional prospects. They represent, according to
Tom Keating, “an article of faith in the practice of Canadian foreign policy for
decades,” and “one of the most defining characteristics of Canadian foreign policy”
(1993: 9-10). Increasingly, though, they have been diverging from U.S. interests, as
evident in the 1990 Canadian proposal for a multilateral trading organization, to
break the GATT Uruguay Round deadlock, which the U.S. summarily rejected
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: 36). Both are WTO members, as is Mexico, but their
attitudes and priorities differ remarkably: Canada pins a lot of hope on the institu-
tion, Mexico’s North American and NAFTA attachments result in no more than lip
service for the WTO, and the U.S. acts largely independently of the WTO, reflecting its
suspicion of an organization it cannot control as it could the GATT.

Behind these convergences and compatibilities as well as divergences and
incompatibilities, leadership may make the difference in bending rules, altering
patterns, and charting new ventures. Austin Ranney’s appraisal of how legislative
electoral candidate selection in various democracies is not irrelevant to chief exec-
utives and sheds light on this study. The last Table 1 row shows significant similar-
ities in the traits most valued among aspirants, and their consistency with the key
dimensions of party ideology discussed previously. His observations of Canada
and the United States are presented with comparable Mexican traits. Clearly the
socioeconomic dimension highlighted previously is common, an overriding fea-
ture, and the springboard of North Americanizing elections, politics, and ideologies.

Yet, the constraints remain. First, as an uneven playing field, North America
will be as dominated politically by the U.S. as it is economically. Second, as a func-
tion of this asymmetry, persisting countervailing Canadian and Mexican forces at
levels below the chief executive and the federal government, furnishing political
capital in times of elections, threaten to neutralize any political integration across the region. Finally, unlike the European case in which a cadre of technocrats provide the infrastructure for political leaders to latch on to, the inverse North American pattern finds political leaders supplying the infrastructure upon which technocrats seek positioning: Canada’s pattern of local politics determining state politics does not create the scope to build regional-level technocrats; Mexico’s top-heavy and one-term presidential leadership prevents long-term technocracy-led institutionalization; and the U.S. separation of powers promotes both local politics through the Congress and international politics through the presidency at the expense of regional politics or long-term technocratic development. This is not to say technocrats are in short supply, but sustaining their commitment to a single goal with limited incentives ultimately prevents a North American regionalized infrastructure from developing on a level playing field. Since regionalization has generally received greater support from elites than the masses, the North American experiment is too understaffed and undernourished to handle integration over sensitive issues. Remarkably, emerging epistemic communities across academia emphasize bilateral or trilateral studies, workshops, programs, college-level courses, and a variety of publications. Not all predate NAFTA, yet their staggering volume and growth-rate are demand greater policy-making attention.

Relating Economic and Political Integration

North American economic integration differed from other cases and is too disconnected with politically integrative efforts. Yet, neither pursuit was stillborn: although a variety of convergences and compatibilities reflect more interdependence than regional integration (Nau, 1979: 119-47), if preferences and circumstances improve in the near future, the infrastructure to shift from interdependence to integration is available. Borrowing from Henry Nau’s work, and modifying the pathfinding treatment of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977: 3-37). Table 2 distinguishes between interdependence and integration.

Contemporary North American experiments may not be far different from West European experiences of the 1950s: just as significant external developments, like the 1971 breakdown of Bretton Woods and the oil price-hikes after 1973 altered the rosy initiation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during the 1950s, so too may external developments shift North America from interdependence toward integration, or from regional integration toward hemispheric or global integration. For example, if China becomes the top U.S. trading partner, Canada
and Mexico may swallow U.S. asymmetry and seek more meaningful regionalized arrangements, or if U.S. indebtedness soars or the dollar collapses, regional arrangements to thwart market vulnerabilities may be reinforced. On the other hand, spiraling Mexican wages may shift U.S. production to Central America or beyond the Western Hemisphere, just as Canada’s immigrants from China and India might diversify interests from North America toward Asia. Of course, another 9/11 would drive the nail of regionalization more forcefully, though not in unpredictable directions.

Integration theories have been known to run in circles, backtrack unpredictably, and even ride the crest of other developments seeking different goals. Generally traced to David Mitrany’s functionalism during World War II (1948: 350-60), they quickly reached a dead-end after the war itself ended. Inquiring why, Ernst B. Haas pointed to the four sins they committed: (a) failure to distinguish background, concurrent, and a posteriori variables; (b) neglecting nationalism; (c) ignoring the external environment; and (d) not recognizing the huge sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes in Europe within which functionalism was being sought (2004: xiv-xv). His study of the ECSC, from its birth with the 1951 Treaty of Paris to the 1957 Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC), corrected these omissions by retaining the state, instead of eliminating it in the process of economic integration.

### Table 2
**INTERDEPENDENCE VERSUS INTEGRATION: INSIGHTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Interdependence</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channels of communication</td>
<td>Multiple, but security most important</td>
<td>Multiple, but economic most important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of issues?</td>
<td>Not necessarily, but military ever-present as dominant priority</td>
<td>Yes, economic definitively at the top</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordination of military?</td>
<td>Yes, conditionally (in crisis)</td>
<td>Yes, unconditionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of institutional membership</td>
<td>Voluntary and involuntary, emphasizing all institutions</td>
<td>Involuntary, emphasizing only central institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst</td>
<td>New knowledge</td>
<td>Competitive markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placement of regionalism</td>
<td>Less important to globalization and nationalism</td>
<td>More important than globalization and nationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from Keohane and Nye, 1997: chapters 1-2; and Nau, 1979: 119-147.
The neofunctionalist end-goal is political integration. In Haas’s own words, political integration is “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (2004: 16). When this happens, a political community is formed “in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority” (2004: 5). His political community differs from the simultaneously advocated security community paradigm of Karl W. Deutsch and others (1957). The key distinction is Haas’s emphasis on institutions and Deutsch’s disinterest in them: according to Haas, they convert ideology into laws. Other characteristics were needed to convert national into supranational orientations (2004: 9-10): (a) interest groups and political parties preferring supranational actions over those of their own national governments; (b) broadening their own interests beyond the state according to those actions; (c) an evolving common ideology connecting them all; (d) generating a common doctrine called supranationalism to replace the existing nationalist doctrine; (e) groups and governments accepting supranational laws even if they conflicted with national laws; and (f) governments socializing the practice of yielding in impasses, rather than applying vetos.

Facilitating political integration, at least in Western Europe at the time, were a number of economic policy initiatives or developments. Haas identified five (2004: 12): (a) eliminating tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls on trade between members; (b) abandoning unilateral actions against trade restrictions; (c) joint action redressing problems stemming from eliminating trade barriers; (d) harmonizing national policies to the greatest extent possible; and (e) permitting free movement of labor and capital.

The question arises as to which of the two paradigms, security community or neo-functionalism, better explains North American developments and transformations.

Security Community Paradigm

In postulating the security community thesis during the 1950s, Deutsch and others distinguished amalgamated from pluralistic varieties, the former involving the surrender of state sovereign rights to a collective body, the latter highlighting commonalities without surrendering sovereign rights. While their respective examples were the United States and the Canada-United States community, Table 3 shows a hypothetical Mexico-U.S. security community increasingly satisfying three pluralist conditions in the top three rows, and all but the surrender of sovereign rights characteristic from the amalgamated alternative in the bottom nine rows.
### Table 3
CONDITIONS OF PLURALISTIC AND AMALGAMATED SECURITY COMMUNITIES: MEXICO-UNITED STATES TRANSFORMATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Pre-1980s</th>
<th>Post-1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value compatibility</td>
<td>Minimal, contradictory; nationalism vs. globalism</td>
<td>Democratic values, liberalism, rules of regional integration, and an emerging binational constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral predictability</td>
<td>Mixture of collaboration and suspicion undermining predictability, in turn reflecting value divergences</td>
<td>Increasing identities pave way for higher predictability, in turn reflect value convergences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual responsiveness</td>
<td>Officially low, publicly slightly higher: different values led to different policy directions; but increasing societal interaction bridged the gap to some extent</td>
<td>Increasing function, galvanized further by increasing rapport between leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value complementarity</td>
<td>Minimal, contradictory; nationalism vs. globalism</td>
<td>Democratic values, liberalism, rules of regional integration, and binationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctiveness in lifestyles</td>
<td>Very high nationalism ensures this</td>
<td>Erosion of nationalism reduces distinctiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward expectations before burden sharing</td>
<td>Minimal burden sharing to trigger common rewards</td>
<td>Greater burden sharing generating future rewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing political and administrative functions</td>
<td>Kept to minimum</td>
<td>Explosion of functions, some symmetrically undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth distinguishing core areas from peripheral areas</td>
<td>Not adequately addressed on bilateral basis; priorities lay elsewhere</td>
<td>Clearly addressed through NAFTA and policy priority: border growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication linkages geographically and socially</td>
<td>Limited linkages existed, but subjected to controls</td>
<td>Linkages proliferate, often without controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiplying communications and transactions</td>
<td>Not possible given the overall nationalistic and/or Cold War orientations</td>
<td>Without doubt: globalization, liberalization, and democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing barriers to mobility across political boundaries</td>
<td>Not really: Braceros promoted mobility, but subject to supervision</td>
<td>Clearly for trade and investment, increasingly for legal human flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing political elites</td>
<td>Evident, but small in numbers and nationalistic in orientations</td>
<td>Massively evident, in numbers and expansive orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
With the 1980s serving as a dividing line, we find value complementarity replacing value competitiveness, facilitating behavioral predictability and mutual responsiveness in the process. Before the 1980s, Mexico’s nationalism contrasted with U.S. internationalism; import substitution diametrically opposed the economic liberalism of GATT, which the U.S. championed but which Mexico did not even join for four full decades; when Mexico campaigned for nuclear non-proliferation through the 1966 Treaty of Chapultepec, the United States was expanding all forms of missiles; President Luis Echeverría’s tercermundismo against the United States was ignored by the U.S.; and as the United States extended democratization to women and Afro-Americans between 1924 and 1964, Mexico consolidated its perfect dictatorship.

Mexico’s sudden policy liberalization and its more glacial social adaptation reconfigured values after the 1980s. Even before Mexican liberalism began, the sexenio crises forced policy-making to become more open and predictable. By the 1990s, the emergence of a robust binational constituency created a critical electoral bloc in both countries (Lawrence, 2002: 1A), and when Hispanics replaced Afro-Americans as the largest U.S. minority by 2003, they became a long-term influential congressional group.

Yet, a Mexico-U.S. security community remains elusive even amidst security considerations. Jorge Domínguez’s and Rafael Fernández de Castro’s three twentieth-century phases of Mexican security strategy help explain why (2001: ch. 2). They found balancing until World War II, abnegation during the 1940s-1960s, and bandwagoning from the 1990s (Jervis and Snyder, 1991), notably under Zedillo. Rival claims over Central America and Cuba led to balancing before World War I, but was replaced by abnegation after 1942: through the Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission, Mexico would not participate in any U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group during the entire Cold War, or join any alliances against the United States, threaten it, build capabilities against it, rely on the U.S. for military purchases, or cooperate appreciably over international security issues. These first three characteristics, according to Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, reflected bandwagoning.

Although David Mares sees Mexico and the U.S. as part of a fairly well-defined pluralistic security community from the 1940s (1995: ch. 2), Stephan Haggard and Guadalupe González González point out the fundamental weaknesses of the argument (1998: 295-332): power asymmetry, U.S. perception of Mexican instability, Mexican unwillingness to protect U.S. property and economic rights, and low trust owing to cross-border externalities such as drugs, immigration, and environmental standards. In a bold attempt to update and revive the Deutschian
model, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett pay a lot more attention to trust and a number of other domestic considerations largely overlooked by theorists of the 1950s (1998: 29-65). Understood as both structure in terms of power and knowledge, and processes of transactions, organizations, and social learning, trust, its precipitating conditions, inducements, and relation with peaceful change improved after the 1980s, suggesting a movement toward Mares’s mature form of a pluralistic security community. Sustaining it after 9/11 against increasingly unpredictable exogenous forces will not be easy.

Except for surrendering its sovereign rights, Mexico satisfies all other criteria of an amalgamated security community, displayed in the last 9 rows of Table 3. The Fox administration’s election proposal to drop barriers to human migration may even be seen as one step toward satisfying that factor, too; and the Fox administration vigorously seeks dual citizenship for these migrants, thus creating a significant transnationalized electoral constituency, itself a new factor in regional integration. Newly created agencies under the Mexican Foreign Ministry (the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, initially headed by the unassuming Oaxacan social worker, Candido Morales; and the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad) specifically addressed the binational community. If both forms of security community fit theoretically, but remain empirically evasive, how does neofunctionalism fare?

**Neofunctionalism and North America**

Based on works by Haas and other scholars, Joseph S. Nye identifies four prerequisites, seven process mechanisms, and three perceptual frameworks of neofunctionalism, listed in that order in Table 4, which examines Mexico-U.S. relations. The prerequisites of political pluralism, economic symmetry, elite complementarity, and adaptability, are well satisfied in Western Europe, but although they show high Mexico-U.S. potential, economic symmetry is hardly attainable for a very, very long time, if at all. Yet, its relative decline over time as a perceptual or policy-making consideration in Mexico may be attributed to increasing per capita income, the intertwining of the two economies, and upgrading of Mexico’s economic performance. With Mexico now among the top fifteen economies in the world, economic symmetry may not appropriately measure its integrative potential since over 85 percent of Mexico’s trade and two-thirds of its investment depend on the United States (IMF, 2000: 326-27, 459-61; Rugman and Gestrin, 1994; and World Bank, 2000: 231). Whether openness facilitates interdependence over integration, or vice versa, it helps convert the former into the latter, thus generating a security community in all but name.
Increasing elite complementarity over the past 20-odd years is matched by increasing Mexican pluralism, while the capacity to adapt is also being vividly demonstrated by each country toward the other. Just as these integrative potentials are more satisfied than not, so too are the several process mechanisms. Those procedures are: spillover; rising transactions; coalition formation; elite socialization; group identity; influence of external actors; and an ideological-identitive claim.

Spillover (Haas, 2004), or what David Mitrany called the doctrine of ramifications (1948: 350-60), really intensified since the 1980s even though it initiated much earlier. Common functions, such as checking illegal immigration to the United States through the 1965 maquiladora program, and developing/managing water rights (BelausteguiGoitia and Guadarrama, 1997: 91-124), exploded into expanding transactions, boosting disagreements, developing NAFTA’s conflict resolution procedures and adjusting national trade relief laws to them; transporting merchandise also necessitated standardizing vehicular emission and safety standards, and depicting spillovers through NAFTA’s labor and environmental side agreements.

More spillover meant more transactions, not just of merchandise, but also of services and human flows, as well as governmental supervision and transactional intervention. NAFTA introduced more regular exchanges of trade, environment, and labor secretaries of the two countries, while labor unions and both moderate and critical environmental groups on both sides of the border also began regular exchanges and formalized meetings (Hogenboom, 1996). Country leaders and societal elites were mobilized to establish regular cross-border contacts. For example, the dispute settlement arrangements for trade, investment, labor, and environment led to monitoring unfair practices of trading any commodity from orange juice to steel (Thurston, 1993: 1A), relocating waste disposal facilities amidst the opposition of municipal laws (Borja Tamayo, 2001: 62-90), facilitating butterfly migration from Canada to Michoacán, Mexico by landscape alterations (Yoon, 2002: 5), and granting extra worker privileges by a benevolent government (Otero, 1995).

As officials and the lay public spoke more in terms of the language of liberalization, market competitiveness, and escalator of economic progress, rather than nationalization, government patronage, or security-riddled considerations until 9/11, ideological identities also broadened and deepened. Engagement abroad reflected the shift from nationalism or introversion toward greater joint action abroad.

Neofunctionalist perceptual frameworks necessarily changed. The bottom three rows of Table 4 captures changes in terms of how (a) benefit distribution is equitable; (b) external problem perception is coherent; and (c) integration is made cost free.
The picture for Mexico and the U.S. may be mixed today, but clearly more positively inclined than before the 1980s. Unlike the zero-sum orientation of both countries toward each other before the 1980s, the positive non-zero sum approach thereafter raises the post-9/11 question if formalized and broader security arrange-

Table 4
PREREQUISITIES, PROCESSES, AND PERCEPTIONS: MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONAL SHIFTS THROUGH NEOFUNCTIONALIST EYES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Pre-1980s</th>
<th>Post-1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic symmetry among units</td>
<td>No, and very little attempt to reduce the gap</td>
<td>No, but upgrading relationship softens gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite complementarity</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
<td>Yes, and increasingly so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>No: perfect dictatorship; flimsy democratic pursuits</td>
<td>Yes, and becoming irreversible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to adapt</td>
<td>Limited and not needed: rigidified societies owing to Cold War and Mexican ISI</td>
<td>Yes, and increasingly so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillover</td>
<td>Prevalent, but within limits</td>
<td>NAFTA expands this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing transactions</td>
<td>Prevalent, within limits</td>
<td>Explosive in variety/volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalist growth</td>
<td>Prevalent, within limits</td>
<td>Exponential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnationalist growth</td>
<td>Prevalent, within limits</td>
<td>Multiplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite socialization</td>
<td>Prevalent, nationalistic</td>
<td>Significant growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in ideological identity</td>
<td>Deliberately very limited</td>
<td>Increasing parallels and convergences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing interaction with external actors</td>
<td>Circumscribed</td>
<td>Limited outside North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit distribution higher and more equitable</td>
<td>Concentrated benefits due to ISI and Cold War</td>
<td>Higher benefits, more equitable distribution, but asymmetry remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converging perceptions of external problems</td>
<td>Limited and mixed</td>
<td>Improving, though gaps remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration as cost-free</td>
<td>Not really: nationalism for Mexico, multilateralism for U.S.</td>
<td>Increasingly so, but subject to externalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
ments or existing socioeconomic differences will deepen integration more (Andreas, 1988: 201-20).

**Summarizing Economic Integration**

Western Europe proceeded more smoothly with economic than political integration. Whereas NAFTA remains locked in Bela Balassa’s first stage of regional economic integration, of adopting free trade arrangements, Western Europe completed this by 1967, when building a customs union based on a common external tariff was well underway. Harmonizing fiscal and monetary policies during the 1970s slowly unfolded a common market, the third stage. With the development of a common currency, the European Community entered the fourth stage, and appropriately changed its name to the European Union at Maastricht in 1992. Only the fifth and final stage of full economic integration remains, but political integration is already underway.

As a 15-year deal, NAFTA’s future depends on leadership and degrees of convergences. In spite of satisfying many, if not all, of the neofunctionalist and security community characteristics, NAFTA still smacks of unfulfillment. Table 5 highlights imponderables in the Mexico-U.S. dyad.

The first involves the degree to which resolving joint problems involve public debate. Before the 1980s both countries were too far apart and headed in quite different directions to seriously pursue this opportunity, but this changed considerably after the 1980s, without implying every common problem would or would not be tackled jointly. Sovereign preferences still prevail over oil for Mexico, national security for the U.S., and drugs and immigration for both. The second dimension similarly shows nationalistic considerations prevailing before the 1980s, but NAFTA has been enhancing mutual benefits ever since. Asking if alternatives to integration are less satisfactory, the third dimension dittoes this same observation: technological and cultural convergences matched by equally formidable divergences. Finally, the fourth dimension inquiry if the two countries have similar policy responses toward non-members, also reiterates the pre-1980s vacuum and the fragile period thereafter.

What are the prospects of preference patterns being re-engineered by elections in North America? The honest answer is both yes and no, but the devil lies in the details.
### Table 5
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS IN MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONAL SHIFTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Pre-1980s</th>
<th>Post-1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of politicizing common problems in order to resolve them</td>
<td>Too far apart for this to have happened automatically or deeply.</td>
<td>Considerable progress made; lays foundation to diversify issue-areas, but sticky issue-areas remain untouched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistributing political and economic resources for common benefits</td>
<td>Not seriously pursued, and when actually pursued, emphasis too nationalistic.</td>
<td>Attempts being made, but gaps in some areas too large for quick resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to integration less satisfactory</td>
<td>On the contrary, they were satisfactory: ISI for Mexico, multilateralism for U.S.</td>
<td>Increasingly so: both markets too intertwined to remain independent; yet deepening integration may be inevitable, but only at incremental speed: neither is prepared for accelerated integration, even less after 9/11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of policy convergence toward non-members</td>
<td>Not an issue: both had independent and antagonist foreign policy imperatives based on national interests.</td>
<td>Not fully tested: Mexican bandwagoning with U.S. policy responses to non-members to large extent; too few external Mexican links for U.S. to be concerned with; customs union still a pipe dream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separating economic and social tasks from political</td>
<td>Difficult proposition given nationalism and militarism.</td>
<td>Difficult still, but slightly improved picture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranationalizing political tasks</td>
<td>No significant efforts made.</td>
<td>Half-hearted beginnings made, but U.S. retains veto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of spillover</td>
<td>High: nationalism, militarism.</td>
<td>Decreasing but not eliminated, some factors permanently present (security).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of political will to enhance economic integration</td>
<td>Economic integration not an issue, but political will to promote nationalism high.</td>
<td>Political will still remains decisive, but economic externalities growing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
Electoral Patterns and Political Reconfigurations: Business as Usual?

Twenty-one years after the Treaty of Rome went into effect, a European Parliament emerged. Although not subordinating state legislatures, supranational preferences reflect growth, adjustments to state counterparts, and occasionally overriding them, for instance, through the growth and stability pact. What are the prospects of similar convergences across North America? Given the asymmetry highlighted in economic integration, this study isolates the election of a U.S. chief executive to measure North Americanization, leaving other dimensions for other studies to examine. If it is high, broadly defined, we would expect collectively formulated policies to increase. Neofunctionalists would find the common economic policies and institutions pushing toward—even demanding—political convergences over issues and institutions. If it is low, every election would retain an introverted focus, preventing issue convergences across boundaries from making a dent. Yet, asymmetry also prevails here: U.S. presidential elections have a greater impact on Canada and Mexico than Canadian or Mexican elections for the chief executive have on the United States.

Connecting free trade with elections, I argue, provided the turning point of North American political integration (Druckman, 1986). More to the point, the coincidental 1988 elections in all three countries may be to North America what the May 9, 1950 Schuman Declaration of Interdependence was to the European Union. Free trade suddenly became an issue in the 1988 Canadian elections, even though Brian Mulroney’s 1984 election victory by the then largest margin in Canadian history predicted the replacement of Pierre Trudeau’s nationalistic economic policies; Mexico’s 1988 elections addressed the dominant issue of the time, of liberalizing a stagnant and protected economy, and thereby implying improved economic relations with the United States; and although only the United States did not have free trade or liberalization at the top of its 1988 electoral agenda, as the first post-Cold War elections, it ventilated several issues suppressed by Cold War imperatives, such as the environment, a peace dividend, immigration, and so forth, almost all imposing free trade restraints.

Canadian and Mexican elections found both countries positioned between domestic concerns and regional possibilities, but the U.S. elections coincided with the emergence of George H.W. Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), a bland proposal expressing infinite hopes. More concretely, the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) did not raise any public U.S. eyebrows since this was a deal between two countries already sharing the largest open-border trans-
actions anywhere in the world, whereas in Canada, memories of how Sir Wilfrid Laurier lost the 1912 elections for agreeing to a free trade agreement with the U.S. were uppermost. Mulroney barely scraped through in 1988, losing 7 percent of the popular vote and 41 parliamentary seats from four years earlier.

Only after Mexico’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari also proposed a free trade agreement with the U.S. in February 1990 (Mayer, 1998: 39-40), and negotiations got underway for NAFTA from September, did free trade hit the U.S. elections. Ross Perot founded the Reform Party to explicitly oppose NAFTA, contested the 1992 elections, and although he lost, as did George H.W. Bush, Perot’s reactions produced the environmental and labor side agreements.

Bush lost the elections not so much because of his advocacy of regional free trade as due to an economy in the doldrums, yet Bill Clinton won the elections not so much by how saggy the economy as for the safeguards he proposed against a possible NAFTA. These side-bar agreements helped NAFTA be ratified, albeit by a narrow margin, and paved the way for the first regionalized institutions to be established under the integrative pursuits: the Commission on Economic Cooperation and the Commission on Labor Cooperation, each with their own intergovernmental councils, society-based joint public affairs committees, and modestly supranationalized dispute-settlement bodies (Hogenboom, 1996; and Otero, 1995: 637-62). For the same reasons as Gilbert R. Winham offered to explain the 1988 CUFTA negotiations, the dispute settlement mechanism became a NAFTA linchpin (1988: 35-36): a bothersome issue for the U.S., but procedurally significant for others. Not just for contentious environmental and labor issues, but also over anti-dumping and countervailing duties as well as investment conflicts, NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanisms (a) began the process of converting North American issue orientation into meaningful institutions; (b) survived better than NAFTA itself through the first ten years of the agreement; and (c) inspired the simplification of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) dispute settlement procedures (Winham and Grant, 1991). Without Canadian and U.S. electoral pressures, these outcomes may not have been possible. Even with those pressures, the United States continues courting the world for more FTAs today. With these arrangements still intact in 2005, North American institutions may be in their embryonic stage.

The Clinton administration’s North American approach also benefited from externalities. First, the longest U.S. economic growth phase in the entire twentieth century came during his tenure, making trade a less prickly issue, especially at election time (and actually making Perot’s political challenge meaningless). Second, when free trade controversies forced Mulroney’s resignation, after serving him a warning in the 1988 elections, Jean Chrétien’s defeat of Kim Campbell, Canada’s first woman prime minister and Mulroney’s successor, by the largest margin in its
electoral history, produced a compatible personal relationship with Clinton based on ideological identity and pragmatism, while successfully riding out secessionist pressures in Quebec, perhaps the last in a long time. Both leaders provided policy continuity and welfare enhancement, suggesting ideology, pragmatism, leadership, and party identity as potential sources of future convergences or integration (Coxe, 2004: 37). Finally, by plucking Mexico out of the 1995 peso crisis, Clinton put the country on the road to reaping full NAFTA harvests, as trade deficits with the U.S. turned into hefty surpluses, easing the democratic transition Zedillo had in mind. In fact, even though Zedillo’s PRI was replaced by a different party after seven decades in 2000, from a North American perspective, the NAFTA commitment remained unchanged. In fact, it got stronger under Vicente Fox Quesada’s PAN, indicating the brief decline of ideological influences along this front. Thus, during the 1990s, all three North American countries simultaneously experienced considerable North Americanization, pragmatism over ideological pushes, more benefits from externalities than costs of political or economic market failures, growth in common values, and increasing integrative irreversibilities.

George W. Bush’s first term began on a grand note with Mexico, the first country he visited after taking office. This broke the tradition of visiting Canada before any other country, elevating Fox and Mexico into a rare, special U.S. friend, then receiving Fox’s immigration proposal. Fox’s target audience was also North Americanized, the binationals, that is, Mexicans with U.S. residency, a booming population of potentially enormous electoral significance in both Mexico and the United States. Bush’s generally supportive stance suggested the two countries, and with them North America as a region, were willing to go beyond trade, investment, environment, and labor on the collective agenda to the sticky political issue of immigration. Other secular developments, however, intervened to prevent what would have been Fox’s coup.

Chrétien’s ideological differences with Bush diluted the North Americanization processes underway. Similarly, the U.S. Congress was not as receptive to Fox’s plans as Bush seemed to have been. Above all, 9/11 shifted U.S. attention and resources almost exclusively to security matters from the brief honeymoon with issues of low politics. U.S. trade interests returned to the multilateral level, just as they had at the outset of the Cold War in 1947 (Hussain, 1993: ch. 4), but this time with the determination to not lose control of developments as it had in the past (Feinberg, 2003). Bush’s competitive liberalization trade strategy reflected this background. Placed in the hands of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, a series of free trade negotiations began in Central America; Canada faded from Bush’s trading radar until Paul Martin’s determination as premier to restore Canada’s privileged place in Washington
post-9/11 (Kitchen, 2004: 693-710); and negative externalities accentuated political and economic market failures through growing North American distrust, disharmony, and dearth of necessary information. The 2004 U.S. elections couldn’t have been better timed to worsen this atmosphere. As I show, in contributing to the deteriorating North American climate, the elections also pushed all three countries to the brink where costly bilateral relations may push them into either breakdown or compromises.

The 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections

All three countries were delicately poised between state and supranational interests on the eve of George W.’s 2004 re-election. Martin thawed U.S. relations but still refused to participate in the U.S. missile defense program. Fox had neither the immigration deal he so cherished, nor the legislative votes to pass his domestic policy measures. Fox’s eclipse from Bush’s priority list elevated Martin’s fortunes. Ultimately, the U.S. needs both neighbors to make homeland security work. This is more likely than Canadian-Mexican relations deepening to chip away at U.S. North American asymmetry.

Even though electoral dynamics may help, it seems U.S. elections may impact Canada and Mexico more than Canadian or Mexican elections the United States. To begin with, Canada’s 2004 elections indicated (a) ideological parallels between the Conservatives and U.S. Republicans; (b) Canada’s multiculturalism, by raising a post-9/11 U.S. red flag, demanded a more pragmatic than ideological handling of relations with the U.S., which Martin understood better than his fellow Liberal predecessor, Chrétien; and (c) domestic issues, such as fiscal balance, health reforms, and the growing East-West divide, also necessitated more policy-making attention than trade.

Mexico’s 2006 presidential elections will be evaluated against the background of (a) NAFTA liberalization extending to very sensitive sectors, such as agriculture and petrochemicals, requiring more regional dialogue and better salesmanship of the collective agenda to an increasingly divided and suspicious population; (b) unpredictability about the future of NAFTA and Mexico’s own transitional domestic politics; and (c) maquiladoras migrating to China. Critical changes continue to be U.S.-related in one way or another.
Spillover Issues

Serving both as a vehicle of political integration and carrying disruptive forces, at least three electoral issues may set the parameters of future North Americanization: (a) immigration; (b) evangelism; and (c) security. Collectively managing them would produce positive integration, but individualized treatment of ignorance would irreversibly negate political integration. All three impact Mexico and the U.S. more than any other North American dyad, but a Canadian conciliatory role could prove critical.

Immigration

Perhaps the thorniest issue in Mexico-U.S. relations, immigration provides real and imaginary problems of electoral value. As Javier Aguilar García shows, the average annual Mexican emigrant figure rose from 29,000 in the 1960s to 390,000 today (2005: 56). In addition to the 13-fold increase, the emigrants no longer go to only perform jobs U.S. citizens won’t do: many are spouses, or sponsored relatives, moving from low-income backgrounds into higher-income societies. According to Erika González and Esther González (González and González, 2002: 61), the roughly 24 million Mexicans legally residing in the United States, not to mention the 8 million undocumented migrants (María Valdez, 2001: 72), constitute U.S. 452 billion dollars in purchasing power, an amount “almost comparable to the size of the entire Mexican economy”. Not only has a huge Hispanic market become part and parcel of the U.S. economy, but it also carries the potential for self-perpetuating growth (by virtue of a higher birth rate), even if further Mexican emigration is halted. That, of course, will not happen, given the incessant U.S. guest-worker program requirements, especially in agriculture, each year.

Political consequences go at least as deep. By expanding the population of border states in the southern and western corners of the United States, Hispanics exert electoral influences: the 2000 census shifted over a score of congressional seats from the northeast to these geographical areas of the United States, creating the potential of Hispanic congressional leaders one day formulating public policies. Thus North Americanization is occurring without the support of formalized integrative procedures or mechanisms, and in the process is breeding undesirable externalities (illegal immigration), political market failures (unnecessary electoral polemics), and sub-optimal policy outcomes (pre-election promises to Hispanics, post-election reversals). Coordinated bilateral policies also offer a honorable exit from the problems doomsday-sayers, such as Samuel P. Huntington and CNN’s Lou Dobbs, perpetually spotlight.
Evangelism

With religion, election outcomes have more vigorous foreign policy consequences, such as, for example, Reagan’s invocation of an “evil empire.” More precisely, it elevated a foreign policy-making cabal to untouchable levels (Mann, 2004). Whether two subsequent wars on Iraq were a product of this untouchability rather than rallying to the defense of tiny Kuwait or against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be debated for a long time to come, but less contentious is the ability of those making military policy to precisely identify the sources of the post-Cold War threat to the United States: actual or perceived weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or any other agent. They even inter-related WMDs and democratization: world opinion was directed at whichever state had WMDs them for not being democratic enough. Eliminating WMDs need not necessarily produce long-term democratization, but why a single member of an “evil empire” became 3 “axes of evil”, and now, after the 2004 election and Condoleezza Rice’s Senate confirmation hearings, 6 “outposts of tyranny”, can be better understood when authoritarianism is interpreted through democratic lenses (Harris, 2005: A01 and VandeHei, 2005: A02): as outposts of tyranny—(another biblical term) Iran, North Korea, Belarus, Cuba, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe face U.S. military intervention, exile-driven democratization, market liberalization, and evangelism.

The conspicuous drift towards the Republican Party of all major groups in the 2004 election, and particularly the lopsided evangelical identification, are not just snapshot developments, but part of a long-term trend beginning in the 1970s when the Roe v. Wade decision provided the spark to the subsequent evangelical fire.

Two long-term trends favoring the Republicans might catalyze party realignment: the born-again and Catholic votes. An apparent cycle representing born-again voting turn-outs suggests George W. Bush is reviving the high levels of support Reagan once commanded, strengthening the argument he is more a Reagan II than a Bush II. With relatively lower support for Republicans in 1980 (64 percent), born-again voters turned out in droves for Republican Reagan in 1984 (80 percent), while Reagan’s coat-tails helped George H.W. get a peak born-again vote tally (81 percent). By 1992, the Reagan legacy had faded since George H.W. proved to be more the east-coast neo-conservative than the heartland New Right; a bad economy worsened by the war in Iraq sent a message still worth remembering today; and secular forces were beginning to gather momentum as the Internet revolution was in a global take-off stage, as was the largest growth period of the U.S. economy. Bush got only 55 percent of the 1992 born-again vote. Lower turn-out led to a paltry 52 percent support for Bob Dole in 1996. With Karl Rove’s machinations, George W.
won back the born-again voters in 2000 (69 percent), and brought many more of them out in 2004 to return to the salient levels of the 1980s, with 78 percent.

Evangelism demands attention. First, it shows that when born-again voters turn up, Republicans enjoy unassailable leverage at the polls. Second, there is no counterpart mainstream cycle, suggesting broader layers of Protestant voters prefer Republicans to Democrats by and large, but are flexible enough to change parties should a different candidate present more appealing credentials, as Clinton did in 1996 and Carter 20 years earlier. Third, the cycle clearly indicates no trend is irreversible unless it is institutionalized: even the evangelical drive can be overcome, as I discuss below. Finally, the born-again cycle can possibly be broken, not necessarily by declining voters, but by institutionalizing born-again norms, such as against abortion, or gay marriages, or influencing the selection of Supreme Court judges, or simply permitting the church to pervade the day-to-day lives of normal citizens. Concrete institutionalization could sustain higher born-again voter turnouts every time there is an election, since they appear more determined and energized than, for example, many liberal groups. However, as Barry C. Burden argues (2004), Bush’s 2004 victory depended less on “moral values” than on a combination of white voters, married women, and a higher turn-out, reflecting concerns over “domestic security” rather than evangelical positions, suggesting secular forces are unlikely to roll over and play dead.

In terms of the second long-term trend, the Catholic votes show the Democrats to be not only uncompetitive in attracting these traditional supporters, but also, given the huge Catholic concentrations in the traditionally Democratic U.S. Northeast, the Republicans look set to challenge Democrats on their home turf.

Streamlining this second observation is the almost wholesale southern shift toward Republicans. It is ironic that Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party, which launched the Civil War, is finally winning the hearts and minds of the southern whites it defeated in the 1860s. In addition to the country itself becoming more conservative, both the born-again appeal and population growth rate across the South generate realignment forces also dividing the country the same way race did for a century after Lincoln. With mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews distributed across the North and the evangelical Protestants growing in appeal and numbers across the South and West, southern segregationist tendencies and sentiments are also likely to revive U.S. WASPS, much to Huntington’s relief.

Implications for Mexico are obvious: first, the southern shift of U.S. politics, even if based on evangelism, makes Mexican emigrants a more robust political player. In the final analysis, Hispanics may either challenge evangelical forces in the United States or join them as they began doing in the 2004 election (Ríos, 2005: 189).
Second, a simultaneous evangelical spread into Mexico’s South to convert indigenous people brings the challenge home to Mexico. It is expected to raise concerns, and challenge the Catholic church, and sow seeds of instability in the countryside. Protestant spread has paralleled the dissemination of market and material values, as well as the spiked alcohol consumption among landless peasants, farmers, and rural dwellers, precisely what the Catholic church is struggling to prevent in Mexico’s marginalized southern provinces. Third, what Mexico faces in its southern provinces also extends across Central America, creating a vast area of evangelism threatening the Catholic order. The more pronounced these incompatibilities become, the more likely the integrative effects of U.S. elections will be matched by disruptive developments simultaneously.

Security

To be sure, 9/11 was not the reason why the Mexico-U.S. honeymoon under Fox and Bush ebbed, nor was this breakdown security-related. The week before, Fox’s migration deal was grounded, not by Bush but by congressmen with sticky feet. This, in turn, delayed Fox’s responses to the traumatic 9/11 events, which was not interpreted very amicably in Washington. A series of minor actions and interpretations conspired to worsen Mexico-U.S. relations more than was due. This routine elevation of post-9/11 security considerations over economic ones was widely interpreted in both Mexico and the United States as reflecting true U.S. colors: in Mexico, it reaffirmed hegemony, with Mexico a hapless victim; and in the U.S., it heightened the need to tighten porous borders which several social segments, such as latter-day sponsors of the Minutemen project, redirected against Mexican emigrants. One externality (9/11) meshed with another (illegal immigration) to produce both economic and political market failures (raising costs of trans-border transactions and placing legal immigrants unfairly under the proverbial gun, respectively). The result: bilateral sub-optimalities. A formalized security community could minimize mutual damages, thus promoting political integration.

Border problems imperil broader foreign policy principles. One such principle for Mexico –and a holy one given its geographical proximity to a superpower– is non-intervention. Historically speaking, the original non-entangling-alliances policy approach George Washington proposed in his 1793 Farewell Address is not far different from Mexico’s equally historic non-intervention. Whereas the United States could conspicuously shift after one century from this orientation toward all sorts of foreign policy entanglements, Mexico is pressured to unwittingly do likewise after
one century of constitutionally-sanctioned non-interventionism. It was difficult for Mexico to do so with respect to U.N. Resolution 1441 in the Security Council during the heated 2003-2004 prelude to the second Iraqi war (Hussain, 2004: 213-30). Nevertheless, by becoming Latin America’s Security Council rotating representative, Mexico’s capacity to pursue non-intervention is questionable: not doing so would strengthen its North American credentials. Mexico’s predicament and U.S. distaste for Mexico’s opposition in the Security Council could have been prevented if North American political integration were more formalized: principles and policy preferences of the three countries could be coordinated bilaterally or trilaterally for more long-lasting results than if done unilaterally, internationally, or multilaterally. Just as misperceptions and misunderstandings in the Canada-U.S. dyad were averted with the formation and maintenance of NATO, they may also not have developed in terms of the Iraq war if Mexico-U.S. coordination had preceded UN Security Council Resolution 1441 deliberations.

Furthermore, benefits would also spread against drug trafficking and money laundering.

Summary

A broad riffle through three persistent Mexico-U.S. problems exposes three inefficient bilateral relations. As in the popular prisoner’s dilemma game, each side finds defection idiosyncratically preferable to cooperation, due in part to a dearth of full information. Shifting to the more collaborative stag hunt game, in which mutual cooperation stems not so much from affection as from necessity, it becomes difficult with a prisoner’s dilemma mentality, but proposes greater North American rewards. Just as NAFTA has shown how pragmatism can reap better relational harvests than nationalism or wishful thinking, North American political pitfalls and perceived problems can also be tackled by working to convert potentials into practice.

Economic and political integration between Canada and Mexico might prove the most effective cure for North American asymmetry: not only would expanded interaction between Canada and Mexico partly offset U.S.-based imbalances, but political convergences between the two would actually provide each other an alternative to unwilling but unavoidable U.S. dependence. What is at stake is large, but neither side is biting as yet. If they don’t, or the longer they take in doing so, the more political integration will be delayed and the higher the costs each side may have to one day pay.
CONCLUSIONS

Central to resolving market failures and softening the shocks of externalities is political leadership. Whether electing a chief executive creates regional spillovers or not, a study of the 2004 U.S. presidential election suggests six forces promoting or preventing North American political integration: (a) the purposeful orientation shift of politicians from ideological and idiosyncratic interpretations toward the pragmatic and international, evident in the policy shift from domestic to foreign interests; (b) institutionalizing the orientation shift, evident in the self-perpetuating growth of bureaucracies and technocrats not held accountable to specific political leaders; (c) apprehensions from divisive integrative messages, such as evangelism, drug trafficking, or money laundering curbing aspirations from such unifying flows as trade and investment from reaching their full potentials, evident in the unnecessary costs imposed by the former upon the latter; (d) safeguarding against external shocks, such as 9/11, by resorting to past collaboratively established networks, rather than retreating from them, evident in joint meetings held and common institutions invoked; (e) exploring new avenues of collaboration, thus opening new competencies and thereby enhancing the indispensability of collective action; and (f) compatible leaders across boundaries.

How have these catalysts impacted the three North American countries? What leadership profile do they ultimately predict? Table 6 profiles the summary below.

In terms of the purposeful orientation shift of potential North American leaders, one might find valid and valuable examples in all three countries: Mulroney and Chrétien in Canada; Salinas, Zedillo, and Fox in Mexico; and Bush, Sr., Clinton, and Bush, Jr., in the U.S.. Each country finds them in both rival political parties, suggesting the ideological differences can be subordinated to pragmatism, and external issues can be brought to bear upon local concerns. Reversibility, however, proves critical. Can the orientation return significantly to ideological and local issues as to subordinate pragmatism and external orientation? Since the 1980s, I argue, this has only happened in the United States, that, too, triggered largely by 9/11. Chief executives in Canada and Mexico, no matter which party they have thus far represented, probably see more win-win outcomes in associating with the United States than their U.S. counterparts may see in deepening Canadian or Mexican relations: the U.S. aggressively seeks more economic relations outside of North America than Canada or Mexico do. Furthermore, U.S. twists and turns cannot all be attributed to 9/11. Evangelism, immigration, and homeland security, as discussed previously, also played their parts in keeping localism and ideological preferences alive.
Have leaders in the three countries sought to institutionalize their orientation shifts? As the second row indicates, in all three countries, chief executives have taken at least the initial steps in this regard, though only in the United States is a reversal appreciated. Through NAFTA and its side agreements, all three countries have thus far either abided by the rulings of dispute settlement mechanisms, or if not, they have sought solutions through commonly established rules rather than resorting to non-compliance. Whether it is NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment disputes or Chapter 19 on anti-dumping and countervailing duties, not to mention the environmental or labor disputes under the respective side agreements, binational panels or trilateral tribunals/commission have helped reduce frictions considerably from the pre-CUFTA or pre-NAFTA eras. These encouraging signs are probably not irreversible, though the bone of contention is more likely to arise in the United

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catalysts</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occurrence of purposeful orientation shift?</td>
<td>Yes: it is bipartisan, and no reversion seen as yet</td>
<td>Yes: it is bipartisan, and no reversion seen as yet</td>
<td>Yes: it is bipartisan, but is reversible (for at least exogenous reasons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of orientation shift?</td>
<td>Has been initiated; no reversal fears as yet; leadership has been critical</td>
<td>Has been initiated; no reversal fears as yet; leadership has been critical</td>
<td>Has been initiated, but remains reversible; leadership is critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gresham’s law in integrative instincts (bad instincts driving out good ones)?</td>
<td>Probability is lower: disagreements have been rules-respecting</td>
<td>Probability is higher: disagreements can be and have been rules-defying</td>
<td>Probability is higher: disagreements can be and have been rules-defying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguarding against external shocks?</td>
<td>Less need: impossible to do so against U.S.</td>
<td>Less need: impossible to do so against U.S.</td>
<td>Greater need: Would produce Pareto sub-optimal results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring new avenues of collaboration?</td>
<td>Consistently missed opportunity</td>
<td>Consistently missed opportunity</td>
<td>Consistently missed opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatible leadership?</td>
<td>Present; necessity-driven</td>
<td>Present; necessity-driven, but with a wild-card possibility</td>
<td>Present; but potential not fully utilized, carries wild-card possibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., 1990: 431-459.
States than in Canada and Mexico since the U.S. Congress exerts more independent impact on trade issues than the Canadian parliament or Mexican legislative chambers. In the final analysis, leadership orientations matter: whether chief executives can sway legislators may prove crucial to any attempt at institutionalizing orientations, indeed to overcoming local, idiosyncratic, and ideological preferences.

Turning to the bad-versus-good messages dichotomy in the third row, owing to the nature of the issues, both Mexico and the U.S. are more ambiguously placed than Canada: both Mexico and the U.S. lock horns over some of these issues, such as drug trafficking or immigration; and although Canada and the U.S. also spar over lumber, port, wheat, salmon, and beer, they have historically sought to outwit each other using bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral rules rather than resorting to the passions that drug trafficking and immigration stir. Canada’s historically longer yearning to involve rules in relations with its more powerful southern neighbor does not always make it the righteous party, as it also resorts to widespread unfair trading practices itself, such as subsidizing truckers or hiding behind provincial laws, but it has been guided more by rules than defiance when compared to Mexico.

Both Canada and Mexico have been more interested in safeguarding against external shocks than the U.S., primarily because both serve less than the U.S. as vehicles of international controversy. Supporting these arguments is the lopsided dependence of both countries on the United States for trade and investment; and although Canada engages in UN peacekeeping and caters to immigrants from the rest of the world, Mexico, even with its more insulated position, occasionally sides with less developed countries, or Latin America. Of course, as a superpower, the U.S. reserves issues of high politics as vital interests; and unless these are threatened, for example by 9/11, low-politics issues, like trade relations, become a favorite engagement. Nevertheless, even over these low-politics issues, the U.S. is more diversified in transactions and objectives than either Canada or Mexico. Ultimately, as with the bad-versus-good message dichotomy, safeguarding against external shocks reveals negative externalities and market failures which North American collaboration can offset, creating demands for political integration rather than supplying it aimlessly.

The fifth row of exploring new collaborative avenues illustrates a case where it takes all three to do the proverbial tango, rather than only two. NAFTA boldly tackles extant trading and investment relations, leaving the more sensitive issue of human flows out of the calculation. Just when NAFTA was blossoming came 9/11, thus constraining policy-makers and negotiators from branching out into discussing marginal or completely new issues. Without a springboard—most likely a leadership
input– NAFTA might remain stuck at this stage of Balassa’s regional integration. Although a much more congenial stage than any existing before the 1980s, unless its full potentials are materialized, North America may suffer from missed opportunities, itself a reason to make leadership orientations more parochial, ideological, and lackluster.

Finally, the sixth row assesses compatibility among North American chief executives. Clearly the first decade of NAFTA provided more reasons to be optimistic than not in this regard, and especially as the compatibility crossed partisanship and ideological preferences. Even though 9/11 came as a rude shock, Canadian and Mexican leaders continue to seek the more compatible side of George W. Bush today after 9/11; and if Bush can show that, even if mildly as he did at the March 2005 Waco Summit, the next five years of NAFTA may generate enough compatibility to fuel a forward momentum into the next stage of regional integration. Economic advances in collaborative efforts can only lubricate political integration. Thus, the United States remains the wild card: Its leaders can promote, stall, or punish North American integrative efforts; and the best Canadian and Mexican leaders can do—as they thus far have indeed done—is to keep up their Panglossian push, hoping their own efforts will result in the best possible of North American circumstances. Another Canadian election is unlikely to rock the boat, although Mexico’s 2006 elections could also produce a wild card: Success for either the PAN or the PRI will most likely translate into maintaining the status quo of their pro-NAFTA preferences, albeit with minor modifications here and there; any PRD success will dramatically show if it has turned pragmatic, as its chief current star, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, seems to be doing in his capacity as Mexico City’s Mayor, or inflate its ideologically-built opposition and resistance. All in all, the period from those elections in 2006 to the 2008 U.S. presidential elections could prove crucial to determining the future of North American political integration, in true Shakespearean to-be-or-not-to-be style.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Two overlapping implications follow. Theoretically, with the exception of one gap, neofunctionalism and security community theses remain relevant in their fundamentals to any explanation of North America, and possibly elsewhere. That gap is North American’s stark asymmetry: Both paradigms are structured to explain symmetrical cases paying less attention to the external domain than to the internal, still doing remarkably well in explaining North America; if modified, however, to
account for uneven playing fields, as seem more likely than not in the international system, their explanatory mileage would be immeasurably enhanced.

An empirical study of North American political integration captures the historical U.S. transition from being an international relations exception to becoming part of the crowd (Lipset, 1996; Mead, 2001). Exceptionalism often recurs: divesting Europe from a place in power rivalry and practically eliminating European multipolar balance of power systems; and pursuing regional economic integration within the rubric of multilateralism rather than against it, utilizing one of the most skewed playing fields on record, thus seriously questioning theoretical tenets. Yet, exceptionalism is also being challenged by regional economic integration, but particularly with regional political integration; it is found unusually on the defensive, supporting the status quo, and promoting the realist cause which it historically challenged, first through isolation, then through Woodrow Wilson internationalism and appeal to moralism.

Its co-protagonists, Canada and Mexico, also reverse gears into exploring the unknown rather than remaining with the familiar. After half a century of realist experiences, though different in tone to the 500 years of European experiences, the United States may be less the extraordinary state than the ordinary one, with all that that entails: it led the way in shaping international institutions, unsuccessfully in the 1920s, but with greater success 20 years later; it alone established multilateralism in the 1940s, only to find equally forceful advocates elsewhere in the 1990s; it originally ignored regional economic blocs while selectively creating political and military associations instead, only to find trading bloc imperatives outlasting the rationale and scope of their military counterparts in the 1990s; and it indiscriminately practiced an unusual brand of unilateralism after World War II, only to find itself clipping those unilateral wings increasingly after winning the Cold War.

Though not irreversible, these transformations raise a central issue. Today’s only superpower is beginning to resemble previous great powers just when those other great powers, both historically and potentially, seek economic integration over military competitiveness given economic, technological, sociological, and U.S.-based developments. As the U.S. adorns old clothes from several prior emperors, Canada and Mexico have no choice but to go with the flow, suggesting more regional integration. Yet, by losing its exceptionalism, the U.S. is as unlikely as any previous great power to accept symmetry. The results: interdependence over integration, economic over political integration, asymmetry instead of symmetry, suboptimal over optimal coexistence, and external over internal triggers. Elections cannot ignore these, but political integration can be denied by them.
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